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Abstract
We develop a theory of repeated interaction for coalitional behavior. We consider stage
games where both individuals and coalitions may deviate. However, coalition members can-
not commit to long-run behavior (on and off the path), and anticipate that today’s actions
influence tomorrow’s behavior. We evaluate the degree to which history-dependence can
ward off coalitional deviations. If monitoring is perfect, every feasible and strictly individ-
ually rational payoff can be supported by history-dependent conventions. By contrast, if
players can make secret side-payments to each other, every coalition achieves a coalitional
minmax value, reducing the set of supportable payoffs to the core of the stage game.
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1 Introduction
The theory of repeated games models self-enforcing conventions where players share an under-
standing of how the future unfolds in response to choices made today and in the past, and given
that shared understanding, no individual wishes to deviate. This theory is central to our under-
standing of dynamic incentives and has been applied across a range of settings.
The main approach for the study of repeated games is non-cooperative, relying on individual
optimization, and without any possibility for joint deviations. But in a number of settings, the
natural units of analysis are not just individuals but also coalitions. For example, matching theory
studies matches where no set of players gains from jointly deviating (“stable matches”). Analyses
of political economy focus on outcomes that are not overruled by decisive coalitions of voters
(“Condorcet winners”). The study of networks focuses on graphs where no pair of individuals
wishes to jointly deviate in their selection of neighbors (“stable networks”).
In all of these settings, one could in principle study the non-cooperative extensive-form that
permits players to jointly deviate by modeling how players form alliances through a process of
public and private offers with acceptance and rejection decisions. But our solutions for modeling
how and which alliances form are sensitive to the extensive-form. Because it is difficult to assess
which extensive-form is appropriate and infeasible to study them all, many studies of collective
behavior follow the approach of cooperative game theory in taking a bird’s eye view to how exactly
alliances form and instead focusing on when alliances are profitable.
Our objective is to combine this cooperative approach with the repeated-games understanding
of dynamic incentives. When such cooperative environments are repeated, what is the appropri-
ate notion of stability? To what degree and when does the power of expectations influence the
incentives and stability of coalitions? What kinds of carrots and sticks are themselves immune to
coalitional deviations? These questions motivate this paper.1
We study self-enforcing conventions of behavior when both individuals and coalitions may
deviate in the repeated play of an abstract stage game. Special cases of this stage game are
strategic-form games (in which players choose actions) and “partitional games” (in which players
partition into groups). Payoffs accrue to players based on outcomes of the stage game, and players
share a common discount factor. Effectivity correspondences specify the moves that each coalition
can make. We consider both non-transferable and transferable utility environments.
In the spirit of repeated games, we adhere to the principle that individuals and coalitions
cannot commit by external means to their long-run behavior, neither on the path of play nor in
their deviations. But the stage game is cooperative: coalitions may act together within a single
1We believe that answering these questions is useful not only for repeated cooperative games but also for
investigating coalitional deviations in repeated non-cooperative games. In practice, players may find ways to
communicate, coordinate, and collude so that groups of them jointly deviate, and just as in cooperative game
theory, it may be useful to study when such joint deviations are profitable without fully specifying how these joint
deviations are coordinated.
1
period. Our goal is to study behavior that is self-enforcing through the power of expectations and
a shared understanding of the future, just as in the standard theory of repeated games, despite
the prospect of these coalitional deviations.
Because there is no “off-the-shelf” solution-concept for this coalitional repeated game, we de-
velop one that is consistent with this motivation by building on pioneering approaches to farsighted
stability in cooperative games (surveyed in Ray 2007 and Ray and Vohra 2015a). We define a con-
vention as a mapping from the history of outcomes to a prescription for today; such conventions
reflect the players’ shared understanding of how the future unfolds in response to past and current
choices. A convention is stable if given this shared understanding, no coalition has a profitable
deviation at any history; in other words, a stable convention lacks profitable one-shot deviations
for all coalitions. We then ask the following question: What can stable conventions implement?
Result for Perfect Monitoring: We pose this question first in a standard setting in which all
behavior by individuals and coalitions is perfectly observed. The first observation is that history-
dependence is a source of stability.2 By making behavior history-dependent, a farsighted coalition
that has a myopic incentive to deviate may not find it in its best interest to do so. We elucidate this
force using simple examples in Section 2: first, we show that in a repeated roommates problem,
every efficient allocation can be supported by a stable convention even if the one-shot interaction
has no stable match. Second, we illustrate in a repeated division problem, if the core of the stage
game is non-empty, a convention can use “core-reversion” to build a stable convention, just like
Nash-reversion in repeated non-cooperative games.
Given these possibilities, we investigate the limits of history-dependence in Section 3. How
much can it support? We find few limits to what a convention can credibly implement in both
non-transferable utility and transferable utility environments (Theorems 1 and 2).
A Folk Theorem For Perfect Monitoring. For every payoff vector that is feasible
and strictly individually rational, there exists a δ < 1 such that if δ > δ, then there is a
stable convention that achieves that payoff.
The set of supportable payoffs identified in this folk theorem coincides with that of Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986), although we allow for coalitional actions and deviations. Thus, we find that
coalitional deviations do not refine the set of sustainable outcomes beyond individual deviations
when players are patient; dynamic incentives effectively ward off coalitional deviations. To put it
differently, a shared understanding of the future—and its associated carrots and sticks—removes
the incentives for coalitions to deviate today if players are sufficiently patient. This result has
a simple intuition: to ward off coalitional deviations, it suffices to punish an individual member
2We are not the first to note that history-dependence can be a source of coalitional stability: Hyndman and
Ray (2007), Vartiainen (2011), and Dutta and Vartiainen (2019) offer similar conclusions in different contexts.
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of each coalition as if she were an individual deviator. This logic applies even when players can
transfer utility to each other to “bribe” others to join their coalition because the convention can
then punish players for paying or receiving bribes.
Secret Transfers: This possibility result leans heavily on the observability of side-payments.
But in many contexts, the power of bribes comes from their secrecy and the inability to condition
future play on them. Our second set of results, exposited in Section 4, finds a sharp contrast when
coalitions can use secret side-payments.
Specifically, suppose that when a coalition blocks an outcome, its members can transfer utility
to each other secretly. In other words, the convention cannot condition future continuation play
on these transfers, although it can condition behavior on the identity and actions of the deviating
coalition. In this setting, players can effectively bribe others to join a deviating coalition; while the
convention identifies who deviated and how (in terms of actions), it does not identify who made
or received the side-payments. We find that this is an important imperfection: secret transfers
severely undermine dynamic incentives, potentially limiting behavior to the core of the stage game,
regardless of players’ patience.
To describe our result, let us define coalition C’s coalitional minmax to be the lowest total
payoff (adding across its constituents) that coalition C can be pushed down to by others when
it can best-respond. This is a coalitional payoff guarantee that is analogous to the individual
minmax, except that it treats the coalition as a single entity whose payoff is the sum of payoffs of
its constituents. In cooperative games without externalities, the coalitional minmax of a coalition
equals its value given by the characteristic function. We prove the following result (Theorem 3).
An Anti-Folk Theorem For Secret Transfers. For each δ < 1, a stable convention
implements only those payoffs that give each coalition at least its coalitional minmax.
The above result states that when transfers are secret, payoffs supported by stable conventions
gives each coalition at least its coalitional minmax. For cooperative games without externalities,
the result implies that the set of sustainable payoffs are those within the core of the stage game,
regardless of players’ patience. Here, dynamic incentives fail to sustain any outcome that could
not have been sustained in the one-shot game.
When externalities are present, then the coalitional minmax involves others outside the coali-
tion taking actions to minimize the gains of the deviating coalition. In this case, our result
relates to a variation of the core to permit externalities: the β-characteristic function suggested
by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1945) derives the value of a coalition C based on that coalition
being minmaxed, and the β-core is the core corresponding to that characteristic function. Our
result implies that stable conventions can implement payoffs only within the β-core of the game.3
3Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1945) also suggest the α-characteristic function, which assumes a maxmin
3
In general, the set of payoffs where each coalition is guaranteed at least its coalitional minmax
is smaller than the set of feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs. Indeed, for some games,
this set is empty.4 Our result implies that in these games, no convention is stable, regardless of the
patience of players. We do not view this conclusion as being nihilistic but as a stark illustration
of how short-term coalitional deviations coupled with secret transfers undermine the dynamic
incentives of a convention.
Why do secret transfers matter? The key idea is that once transfers are secret, a deviating
coalition can structure their transfers to ensure that if it collectively gains from deviation, then
so does each individual member without changing the continuation play. Thus, the convention
can no longer single out a member of that coalition to credibly punish and must instead do its
best to punish the entire deviating coalition. More formally, we prove that with secret transfers, a
One-Shot Coalitional Deviation Principle applies: a coalition lacks a profitable one-shot deviation
from a convention if and only if it lacks a profitable multi-shot deviation.
This result (Lemma 1) is the crux of the Anti-Folk Theorem: any convention that sustains an
outcome below a coalitional minmax is susceptible to these multi-shot deviations and therefore
by this principle, has a profitable one-shot deviation. Hence, such a convention is unstable. This
result illustrates that once coalitions can make secret transfers, long-term commitments are no
longer necessary for coalitions to capitalize on long-term gains; such gains can be appropriated
using short-term commitments and secret side-payments.
Iterating this logic yields a tighter bound. Since the grand coalition can also guarantee itself a
coalitional minmax, payoffs must be on the efficiency frontier at every history. Define the efficient
β-core to be the set of payoffs that are both (i) efficient, and (ii) give each coalition above the
coalitional minmaxes in a reduced game where only efficient alternatives may be chosen. We prove
in Theorem 4 that for every discount factor, stable conventions support payoffs only within the
efficient β-core of the game and that as players become arbitrarily patient, every payoff within the
relative interior of that set can be sustained.
Thus, we see that once coalitions can make secret transfers, they do not need long-term com-
mitments to effectively deviate and guarantee a coalitional minmax. The appropriate analysis
treats each non-singleton coalition as a fictitious entity, expanding the number of players from n
to 2n − 1, and the efficient β-core emerges as the relevant folk theorem for this set of “players.”
The β-core is often criticized on the grounds that it is unclear as to why individuals outside of a
coalition would try to minimize the payoffs of those within the blocking coalition; for example, see
Chapter 2 of Ray (2007). That criticism is exactly right when the concept is applied to one-shot
interactions where those outside a blocking coalition have no reason to hurt themselves to punish
procedure. In settings where each coalition can use a private correlation device, the Minmax Theorem implies that
the two are identical.
4The set is non-empty if and only if the induced characteristic function satisfies the conditions of the Bondareva-
Shapley Theorem.
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deviators. In a repeated game, however, coalitions can be rewarded for punishing others. But this
can be done only to a limited extent and must use efficient alternatives. If transfers can be made
secretly within blocking coalitions, the efficient β-core may be an appropriate description of the
set of sustainable outcomes.
Understanding Laws and Norms: In addition to investigating the role of dynamics and
history-dependence in coalitional behavior, we view these results as speaking to the role of expec-
tations in legal, community, and political enforcement. One perspective of laws and norms—dating
back at least to the work of Hume (1740) if not earlier—treats them as shared understandings
that individuals have of each other with the proviso that that understanding be credible and
self-enforcing. Basu (2000) summarizes this idea beautifully:
In the end, all are caught in a web of self-reinforcing sanctions...law’s empire, tangible
and all-encompassing as it may seem, is founded on little else than beliefs.
This perspective is a recurring theme of academic and popular discourse, reflected both in
work that assesses the strength of institutions by the degree to which they are self-enforcing, and
in concerns expressed about how the actions of some political elites erode institutional norms.5
It appears to us that for a shared understanding to be self-enforcing, it must be immune to both
individual and coalitional deviations. As we know from countless cases of corruption and coups,
individuals who are supposed to be punished often are able to evade sanctions by profitably bribing
their punishers and partnering with them. Analogously, when the protest of multiple citizen groups
is needed to oust a political leader, that leader may offer patronage to some of those groups to
retain power. With this issue in mind, we study when a shared understanding of sanctions and
rewards is credible from the perspective of not only individual but also coalitional deviations. In
other words, if all players share an understanding of future behavior, when is it that no coalition
of players finds it profitable to deviate today?
Our results suggest that the observability of transfers plays an important role in enforcement.
If transfers are observable, laws may successfully implement a large range of outcomes without
encouraging any coalition to deviate. But once parties can make secret side-payments, there is
less that laws can implement that are immune to coalitional deviations.
We illustrate some of these ideas in Section 5 where we study pure division problems in which
a group of players choose how to divide resources. These games are studied as simple games
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1945) in cooperative game theory, and feature in the study of
legislative bargaining (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). We study the degree to which history-dependent
interactions can motivate political elites to share resources with those who are not elites. We show
5This is a vast literature across the social sciences, some examples of which are Posner (1997), Weingast (1997),
Przeworski and Maravall (2003), Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004), Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2010, 2012),
Fearon (2011), Bidner and Francois (2013), Francois, Rainer and Trebbi (2015), Acemoglu and Jackson (2017),
Mailath, Morris and Postlewaite (2017), and Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2018, 2019).
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that when side-payments are perfectly observable, then even for fixed discount factors, substantial
sharing with non-elite citizens can be supported by stable conventions. However, once elites can
make secret side-payments to co-opt others, then elites always obtain all of the surplus.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is part of a growing literature that combines elements from both cooperative and
non-cooperative game theory to understand stable social arrangments; for example, with respect
to incomplete information, see Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite and Samuelson (2014) and Liu (2018),
or with respect to reasoning, see Ambrus (2006, 2009) and Lipnowski and Sadler (2019).6 We
develop new notions of coalitional stability when those coalitions act under the shadow of the
future. Accordingly, we build on important precursors in cooperative and repeated games, and
describe some of the most closely related papers below.
Our work is closely related to the study of farsighted stability in coalitional games, surveyed in
Ray (2007) and Ray and Vohra (2015a). One approach to these issues describes sets of outcomes
that are immune to profitable coalitional deviations where each deviating coalition anticipates
potential chains of subsequent deviations; see Harsanyi (1974), Chwe (1994), Xue (1998), Diaman-
toudi and Xue (2003), Jordan (2006), Ray and Vohra (2015b), Dutta and Vohra (2017), Kimya
(2019), and Vohra r© Ray (2019). While most of this literature considers chains of deviations in a
way that is history-independent, Dutta and Vartiainen (2019) illustrate how history-dependence
can guarantee existence across a general class of games.
A more closely related strand, initiated by Konishi and Ray (2003), studies real-time coalition-
formation processes, and our solution-concept builds on their’s. Their framework is dynamic
and cooperative: coalitional structures generate payoffs in real time, and coalitions evaluate their
moves according to a recursive continuation value, just like our formulation of a stable convention
in Definition 3.7 Behavior in this setting is “Markov,” where coalitions condition their behav-
ior only on the payoff-relevant state and not how it was reached. Hyndman and Ray (2007)
introduce history-dependence with long-term binding agreements that can be renegotiated only
by all affected parties. Vartiainen (2011) establishes existence of history-dependent absorbing
deterministic farsightedly stable processes in a variation of this game without discounting.
We build on this strand with several notable differences. We study an abstract repeated game—
which embeds both coalitional and strategic-form games—where all alliances are temporary and
the only intertemporal interlinkage is the publicly observed history. We investigate the power and
limits of history-dependence, with and without transfers, and we have not seen analogues of our
6Analogously, there is growing interest in modeling dynamic reasoning in matching; see Corbae, Temzelides and
Wright (2003), Damiano and Lam (2005), Du and Livne (2016), Kadam and Kotowski (2018a,b), Doval (2018),
Liu (2019), and Kotowski (2019).
7Also related are Gomes and Jehiel (2005) and Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2012), who model real-time
coalition-formation through the Markov Perfect Equilibria of a non-cooperative extensive-form model.
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folk and anti-folk theorems in this prior literature. Incidentally, the direction in which we proceed
is suggested in the conclusion of Ray (2007, pp. 301) as being a potentially important direction
for further research on coalitional games:
It would be of interest to investigate dynamic noncooperative games with (nonbinding) coali-
tion formation...one might begin with the partition function so that the formation of a coalition
structure at any date has a definite impact on payoffs, perhaps through the writing of binding
agreements within coalitions in any period. But the important difference...is that such agree-
ments would—by assumption—be up for grabs at the end of every period. There are no binding
agreements that last for longer than a single date.
A special case of our model is the innovative model of Bernheim and Slavov (2009), who extend
the notion of a Condorcet Winner to an infinitely repeated game. They study history-dependent
policy programs that at each stage are majority-preferred to paths generated by deviations. Spe-
cialized to their setting, our solution-concept coincides with their’s. They study properties and
applications of this solution-concept, but do not derive bounds on what it can enforce. Since
individuals have no individual actions in their model, our results establish that all payoffs are
sustainable (so long as players have non-equivalent utilities) as δ → 1.
Our results emphasize how coalitional deviations coupled with secret side-payments undermine
dynamic incentives in the repeated game. Barron and Guo (2019) study a closely related issue
in the context of relational contracting between a long-run Principal and a sequence of short-run
agents. They capture a beautiful and realistic friction: secret side-payments exposes the Principal
to extortion by shirking agents. Our results are complementary in that the strategic issue of our
paper is not that of extortion but of being able to structure transfers in a way that allows coalitions
to deviate while shielding its members from excessive punishment. More broadly, the challenge of
secret side-payments is also an important theme in collusion in mechanism design; see Section 5
of Mookherjee (2006) for a survey.
Numerous papers in repeated games adopt cooperative criteria to select equilibria. Aumann
(1959) and Rubinstein (1980) respectively study the Strong Nash and Strong Perfect Equilibria
of an infinitely repeated game with limit-of-means and overtaking discounting criteria. Their
solution-concepts assume that each coalition can commit to arbitrary long-run deviations off the
path of play but not on-path. DeMarzo (1992) focuses on finite-horizon games and proposes
an inductive solution-concept where behavior corresponds to a Strong Nash Equilibrium of the
reduced normal-form game. He uses scapegoat strategies to prove a similar Folk Theorem as our
NTU result for finitely repeated games.8 Also related is the important work on renegotiation-
proofness (e.g. Pearce 1987; Bernheim and Ray 1989; Farrell and Maskin 1989), most of which
focuses on deviations by the grand coalition to different behavior in the continuation game. By
8He also briefly studies infinite-horizon games, but because his solution-concept differs from ours, a similar folk
theorem obtains only for two-player games.
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contrast, our focus is on short-term deviations by all coalitions where players cannot “re-wire”
expectations about continuation behavior.
2 Examples
2.1 The Roommates Problem
We illustrate our ideas in a repeated version of the “roommates problem.” Consider three players—
Alice, Bob, and Carol—who are choosing between rooming together or remaining unmatched. The
challenge is that only a pair can room together, and so at least one player is always alone. The
table below describes their stage-game payoffs:
Alice Bob Carol
Alice 1 3 2
Bob 2 1 3
Carol 3 2 1
Table 1. Payoffs of Row Player from matching with Column Player (or remaining unmatched).
A matching specifies who rooms with whom, and a stable match is immune to profitable
individual and coalitional deviations: there should be no pair of players who prefer to room with
each other over their current match nor an individual player who prefers rooming alone to her
match. A well-known challenge is that every match in this one-shot interaction is unstable.
We model a setting where players match repeatedly, share a common discount factor δ, and
the match today can condition on past outcomes. A coalition may choose to jointly deviate today,
but coalitions cannot commit to future deviations; in other words, the matching convention has to
be immune to profitable one-shot coalitional deviations. We call such history-dependent matching
processes stable conventions.
Figure 1 depicts a stable convention. In this stable convention, Alice and Bob are matched
in every period on the path of play, and Carol remains unmatched. Bob and Carol each have a
myopic incentive to deviate by matching with each other. But the history-dependent matching
process ensures that Bob does not wish to deviate if he is sufficiently patient: should Bob and
Carol deviate, then in every subsequent period, the process specifies that Bob remains unmatched.
Given this punishment, Bob prefers to stay matched with Alice in each period if
(1− δ)(3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob-Carol for a single period
+ δ(1)︸︷︷︸
Unmatched forever, discounted
≤ 2︸︷︷︸
Alice-Bob Forever
,
which is satisfied whenever δ ≥ 1
2
.
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{B,C} Deviates
( BC | A  )
u = (1, 3, 2)
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{A,B} Deviates
{B,
C} 
De
via
tes
( AC | B  )
u = (2, 1, 3)
<latexit sha1_base64="BuQS7o/w7aw ihCtwYwn5JBkqLWs=">AAAB8nicbZDLSgMxFIbP1Futt1GXboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuGz BtkI7lEyaaUMzmSHJCGXoY7hxoYhbH8JncOdb+Aiml4W2/hD4+P9zyDknSATXxvO+ nNza+sbmVn67sLO7t3/gHh61dJwqypo0FrG6D4hmgkvWNNwIdp8oRqJAsHYwupnm7 QemNI/lnRknzI/IQPKQU2Ks1UmvS9UywmV0cd5zi17FmwmtAl5AseY2vj8AoN5zP7v 9mKYRk4YKonUHe4nxM6IMp4JNCt1Us4TQERmwjkVJIqb9bDbyBJ1Zp4/CWNknDZq5 vzsyEmk9jgJbGREz1MvZ1Pwv66QmvPIzLpPUMEnnH4WpQCZG0/1RnytGjRhbIFRxO yuiQ6IINfZKBXsEvLzyKrSqFexVcAMXax7MlYcTOIUSYLiEGtxCHZpAIYZHeIYXxzh PzqvzNi/NOYueY/gj5/0HGk+RVQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZTa6pH/iv8v 0dw0BYdPiu8qGVC0=">AAAB8nicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSdboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuHD Rgr1AO5RMmmlDM8mQZIQy9Alcu3GhiFvfwjdw51v4CKaXhbb+EPj4/3PIOSeIOdPG 876czMrq2vpGdjO3tb2zu+fuHzS0TBShdSK5VK0Aa8qZoHXDDKetWFEcBZw2g+H1J G/eU6WZFHdmFFM/wn3BQkawsVY7uSqUixAV4flZ1817JW8quAxoDvmKW/v+uD16qHb dz05PkiSiwhCOtW4jLzZ+ipVhhNNxrpNoGmMyxH3atihwRLWfTkcew1Pr9GAolX3C wKn7uyPFkdajKLCVETYDvZhNzP+ydmLCSz9lIk4MFWT2UZhwaCSc7A97TFFi+MgCJ orZWSEZYIWJsVfK2SOgxZWXoVEuIa+Eaihf8cBMWXAMTkABIHABKuAGVEEdECDBI3g GL45xnpxX521WmnHmPYfgj5z3H2Adkkk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZTa6pH/iv8v 0dw0BYdPiu8qGVC0=">AAAB8nicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSdboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuHD Rgr1AO5RMmmlDM8mQZIQy9Alcu3GhiFvfwjdw51v4CKaXhbb+EPj4/3PIOSeIOdPG 876czMrq2vpGdjO3tb2zu+fuHzS0TBShdSK5VK0Aa8qZoHXDDKetWFEcBZw2g+H1J G/eU6WZFHdmFFM/wn3BQkawsVY7uSqUixAV4flZ1817JW8quAxoDvmKW/v+uD16qHb dz05PkiSiwhCOtW4jLzZ+ipVhhNNxrpNoGmMyxH3atihwRLWfTkcew1Pr9GAolX3C wKn7uyPFkdajKLCVETYDvZhNzP+ydmLCSz9lIk4MFWT2UZhwaCSc7A97TFFi+MgCJ orZWSEZYIWJsVfK2SOgxZWXoVEuIa+Eaihf8cBMWXAMTkABIHABKuAGVEEdECDBI3g GL45xnpxX521WmnHmPYfgj5z3H2Adkkk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OVca3xVi257 VjEk8nm2tHkSy7oA=">AAAB8nicbVBNSwMxEM3Wr1q/qh69BItQoZRNPehFKHjxWMF +wHYp2TTbhmY3SzIrlKU/w4sHRbz6a7z5b0zbPWjrg4HHezPMzAsSKQy47rdT2Njc 2t4p7pb29g8Oj8rHJx2jUs14mympdC+ghksR8zYIkLyXaE6jQPJuMLmb+90nro1Q8 SNME+5HdBSLUDAKVvLS22qjhkkNX10OyhW37i6A1wnJSQXlaA3KX/2hYmnEY2CSGuM RNwE/oxoEk3xW6qeGJ5RN6Ih7lsY04sbPFifP8IVVhjhU2lYMeKH+nshoZMw0Cmxn RGFsVr25+J/npRDe+JmIkxR4zJaLwlRiUHj+Px4KzRnIqSWUaWFvxWxMNWVgUyrZE Mjqy+uk06gTt04eSKXp5nEU0Rk6R1VE0DVqonvUQm3EkELP6BW9OeC8OO/Ox7K14OQ zp+gPnM8f+nmPBA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="BuQS7o/w7aw ihCtwYwn5JBkqLWs=">AAAB8nicbZDLSgMxFIbP1Futt1GXboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuGz BtkI7lEyaaUMzmSHJCGXoY7hxoYhbH8JncOdb+Aiml4W2/hD4+P9zyDknSATXxvO+ nNza+sbmVn67sLO7t3/gHh61dJwqypo0FrG6D4hmgkvWNNwIdp8oRqJAsHYwupnm7 QemNI/lnRknzI/IQPKQU2Ks1UmvS9UywmV0cd5zi17FmwmtAl5AseY2vj8AoN5zP7v 9mKYRk4YKonUHe4nxM6IMp4JNCt1Us4TQERmwjkVJIqb9bDbyBJ1Zp4/CWNknDZq5 vzsyEmk9jgJbGREz1MvZ1Pwv66QmvPIzLpPUMEnnH4WpQCZG0/1RnytGjRhbIFRxO yuiQ6IINfZKBXsEvLzyKrSqFexVcAMXax7MlYcTOIUSYLiEGtxCHZpAIYZHeIYXxzh PzqvzNi/NOYueY/gj5/0HGk+RVQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZTa6pH/iv8v 0dw0BYdPiu8qGVC0=">AAAB8nicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSdboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuHD Rgr1AO5RMmmlDM8mQZIQy9Alcu3GhiFvfwjdw51v4CKaXhbb+EPj4/3PIOSeIOdPG 876czMrq2vpGdjO3tb2zu+fuHzS0TBShdSK5VK0Aa8qZoHXDDKetWFEcBZw2g+H1J G/eU6WZFHdmFFM/wn3BQkawsVY7uSqUixAV4flZ1817JW8quAxoDvmKW/v+uD16qHb dz05PkiSiwhCOtW4jLzZ+ipVhhNNxrpNoGmMyxH3atihwRLWfTkcew1Pr9GAolX3C wKn7uyPFkdajKLCVETYDvZhNzP+ydmLCSz9lIk4MFWT2UZhwaCSc7A97TFFi+MgCJ orZWSEZYIWJsVfK2SOgxZWXoVEuIa+Eaihf8cBMWXAMTkABIHABKuAGVEEdECDBI3g GL45xnpxX521WmnHmPYfgj5z3H2Adkkk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ZTa6pH/iv8v 0dw0BYdPiu8qGVC0=">AAAB8nicbZDLSgMxFIYz9VbrbdSdboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuHD Rgr1AO5RMmmlDM8mQZIQy9Alcu3GhiFvfwjdw51v4CKaXhbb+EPj4/3PIOSeIOdPG 876czMrq2vpGdjO3tb2zu+fuHzS0TBShdSK5VK0Aa8qZoHXDDKetWFEcBZw2g+H1J G/eU6WZFHdmFFM/wn3BQkawsVY7uSqUixAV4flZ1817JW8quAxoDvmKW/v+uD16qHb dz05PkiSiwhCOtW4jLzZ+ipVhhNNxrpNoGmMyxH3atihwRLWfTkcew1Pr9GAolX3C wKn7uyPFkdajKLCVETYDvZhNzP+ydmLCSz9lIk4MFWT2UZhwaCSc7A97TFFi+MgCJ orZWSEZYIWJsVfK2SOgxZWXoVEuIa+Eaihf8cBMWXAMTkABIHABKuAGVEEdECDBI3g GL45xnpxX521WmnHmPYfgj5z3H2Adkkk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="OVca3xVi257 VjEk8nm2tHkSy7oA=">AAAB8nicbVBNSwMxEM3Wr1q/qh69BItQoZRNPehFKHjxWMF +wHYp2TTbhmY3SzIrlKU/w4sHRbz6a7z5b0zbPWjrg4HHezPMzAsSKQy47rdT2Njc 2t4p7pb29g8Oj8rHJx2jUs14mympdC+ghksR8zYIkLyXaE6jQPJuMLmb+90nro1Q8 SNME+5HdBSLUDAKVvLS22qjhkkNX10OyhW37i6A1wnJSQXlaA3KX/2hYmnEY2CSGuM RNwE/oxoEk3xW6qeGJ5RN6Ih7lsY04sbPFifP8IVVhjhU2lYMeKH+nshoZMw0Cmxn RGFsVr25+J/npRDe+JmIkxR4zJaLwlRiUHj+Px4KzRnIqSWUaWFvxWxMNWVgUyrZE Mjqy+uk06gTt04eSKXp5nEU0Rk6R1VE0DVqonvUQm3EkELP6BW9OeC8OO/Ox7K14OQ zp+gPnM8f+nmPBA==</latexit>
( AB | C   ) 
u = (3, 2, 1)
<latexit sha1_base64="1o9Vhw226PQQBSLjPdWk7jaO0mg=">AAAB8nicbZDLSg MxFIbP1Futt1GXboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuGzBtkI7lEyaaUMzmSHJCGXoY7hxoYhbH8JncOdb+Aiml4W2/hD4+P9zyDknSATXxvO+nNza+sbmVn67sLO7t3/gHh61dJwqypo0F rG6D4hmgkvWNNwIdp8oRqJAsHYwupnm7QemNI/lnRknzI/IQPKQU2Ks1UmvSxdlVC0jfN5zi17FmwmtAl5AseY2vj8AoN5zP7v9mKYRk4YKonUHe4nxM6IMp4JNCt1Us4T QERmwjkVJIqb9bDbyBJ1Zp4/CWNknDZq5vzsyEmk9jgJbGREz1MvZ1Pwv66QmvPIzLpPUMEnnH4WpQCZG0/1RnytGjRhbIFRxOyuiQ6IINfZKBXsEvLzyKrSqFexVcAMXax 7MlYcTOIUSYLiEGtxCHZpAIYZHeIYXxzhPzqvzNi/NOYueY/gj5/0HGliRVQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="8h2CVRpdyMgEEc3Tn/Gw1QdAfAE=">AAAB8nicbZDLSg MxFIYz9VbrbdSdboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuHDRgr1AO5RMmmlDM8mQZIQy9Alcu3GhiFvfwjdw51v4CKaXhbb+EPj4/3PIOSeIOdPG876czMrq2vpGdjO3tb2zu+fuHzS0TBShd SK5VK0Aa8qZoHXDDKetWFEcBZw2g+H1JG/eU6WZFHdmFFM/wn3BQkawsVY7uSqcF2G5CNFZ1817JW8quAxoDvmKW/v+uD16qHbdz05PkiSiwhCOtW4jLzZ+ipVhhNNxrpN oGmMyxH3atihwRLWfTkcew1Pr9GAolX3CwKn7uyPFkdajKLCVETYDvZhNzP+ydmLCSz9lIk4MFWT2UZhwaCSc7A97TFFi+MgCJorZWSEZYIWJsVfK2SOgxZWXoVEuIa+Eai hf8cBMWXAMTkABIHABKuAGVEEdECDBI3gGL45xnpxX521WmnHmPYfgj5z3H2Amkkk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="8h2CVRpdyMgEEc3Tn/Gw1QdAfAE=">AAAB8nicbZDLSg MxFIYz9VbrbdSdboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuHDRgr1AO5RMmmlDM8mQZIQy9Alcu3GhiFvfwjdw51v4CKaXhbb+EPj4/3PIOSeIOdPG876czMrq2vpGdjO3tb2zu+fuHzS0TBShd SK5VK0Aa8qZoHXDDKetWFEcBZw2g+H1JG/eU6WZFHdmFFM/wn3BQkawsVY7uSqcF2G5CNFZ1817JW8quAxoDvmKW/v+uD16qHbdz05PkiSiwhCOtW4jLzZ+ipVhhNNxrpN oGmMyxH3atihwRLWfTkcew1Pr9GAolX3CwKn7uyPFkdajKLCVETYDvZhNzP+ydmLCSz9lIk4MFWT2UZhwaCSc7A97TFFi+MgCJorZWSEZYIWJsVfK2SOgxZWXoVEuIa+Eai hf8cBMWXAMTkABIHABKuAGVEEdECDBI3gGL45xnpxX521WmnHmPYfgj5z3H2Amkkk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VJhwrbN2ttMNHZt9qluw4XKDLdo=">AAAB8nicbVBNSw MxEM3Wr1q/qh69BItQoZRNPehFKHjxWMF+wHYp2TTbhmY3SzIrlKU/w4sHRbz6a7z5b0zbPWjrg4HHezPMzAsSKQy47rdT2Njc2t4p7pb29g8Oj8rHJx2jUs14mympdC+gh ksR8zYIkLyXaE6jQPJuMLmb+90nro1Q8SNME+5HdBSLUDAKVvLS2+pVDTdqmFwOyhW37i6A1wnJSQXlaA3KX/2hYmnEY2CSGuMRNwE/oxoEk3xW6qeGJ5RN6Ih7lsY04sb PFifP8IVVhjhU2lYMeKH+nshoZMw0CmxnRGFsVr25+J/npRDe+JmIkxR4zJaLwlRiUHj+Px4KzRnIqSWUaWFvxWxMNWVgUyrZEMjqy+uk06gTt04eSKXp5nEU0Rk6R1VE0D VqonvUQm3EkELP6BW9OeC8OO/Ox7K14OQzp+gPnM8f+oKPBA==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="1o9Vhw226PQQBSLjPdWk7jaO0mg=">AAAB8nicbZDLSg MxFIbP1Futt1GXboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuGzBtkI7lEyaaUMzmSHJCGXoY7hxoYhbH8JncOdb+Aiml4W2/hD4+P9zyDknSATXxvO+nNza+sbmVn67sLO7t3/gHh61dJwqypo0F rG6D4hmgkvWNNwIdp8oRqJAsHYwupnm7QemNI/lnRknzI/IQPKQU2Ks1UmvSxdlVC0jfN5zi17FmwmtAl5AseY2vj8AoN5zP7v9mKYRk4YKonUHe4nxM6IMp4JNCt1Us4T QERmwjkVJIqb9bDbyBJ1Zp4/CWNknDZq5vzsyEmk9jgJbGREz1MvZ1Pwv66QmvPIzLpPUMEnnH4WpQCZG0/1RnytGjRhbIFRxOyuiQ6IINfZKBXsEvLzyKrSqFexVcAMXax 7MlYcTOIUSYLiEGtxCHZpAIYZHeIYXxzhPzqvzNi/NOYueY/gj5/0HGliRVQ==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="8h2CVRpdyMgEEc3Tn/Gw1QdAfAE=">AAAB8nicbZDLSg MxFIYz9VbrbdSdboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuHDRgr1AO5RMmmlDM8mQZIQy9Alcu3GhiFvfwjdw51v4CKaXhbb+EPj4/3PIOSeIOdPG876czMrq2vpGdjO3tb2zu+fuHzS0TBShd SK5VK0Aa8qZoHXDDKetWFEcBZw2g+H1JG/eU6WZFHdmFFM/wn3BQkawsVY7uSqcF2G5CNFZ1817JW8quAxoDvmKW/v+uD16qHbdz05PkiSiwhCOtW4jLzZ+ipVhhNNxrpN oGmMyxH3atihwRLWfTkcew1Pr9GAolX3CwKn7uyPFkdajKLCVETYDvZhNzP+ydmLCSz9lIk4MFWT2UZhwaCSc7A97TFFi+MgCJorZWSEZYIWJsVfK2SOgxZWXoVEuIa+Eai hf8cBMWXAMTkABIHABKuAGVEEdECDBI3gGL45xnpxX521WmnHmPYfgj5z3H2Amkkk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="8h2CVRpdyMgEEc3Tn/Gw1QdAfAE=">AAAB8nicbZDLSg MxFIYz9VbrbdSdboJFqFDKpC50IxTcuHDRgr1AO5RMmmlDM8mQZIQy9Alcu3GhiFvfwjdw51v4CKaXhbb+EPj4/3PIOSeIOdPG876czMrq2vpGdjO3tb2zu+fuHzS0TBShd SK5VK0Aa8qZoHXDDKetWFEcBZw2g+H1JG/eU6WZFHdmFFM/wn3BQkawsVY7uSqcF2G5CNFZ1817JW8quAxoDvmKW/v+uD16qHbdz05PkiSiwhCOtW4jLzZ+ipVhhNNxrpN oGmMyxH3atihwRLWfTkcew1Pr9GAolX3CwKn7uyPFkdajKLCVETYDvZhNzP+ydmLCSz9lIk4MFWT2UZhwaCSc7A97TFFi+MgCJorZWSEZYIWJsVfK2SOgxZWXoVEuIa+Eai hf8cBMWXAMTkABIHABKuAGVEEdECDBI3gGL45xnpxX521WmnHmPYfgj5z3H2Amkkk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="VJhwrbN2ttMNHZt9qluw4XKDLdo=">AAAB8nicbVBNSw MxEM3Wr1q/qh69BItQoZRNPehFKHjxWMF+wHYp2TTbhmY3SzIrlKU/w4sHRbz6a7z5b0zbPWjrg4HHezPMzAsSKQy47rdT2Njc2t4p7pb29g8Oj8rHJx2jUs14mympdC+gh ksR8zYIkLyXaE6jQPJuMLmb+90nro1Q8SNME+5HdBSLUDAKVvLS2+pVDTdqmFwOyhW37i6A1wnJSQXlaA3KX/2hYmnEY2CSGuMRNwE/oxoEk3xW6qeGJ5RN6Ih7lsY04sb PFifP8IVVhjhU2lYMeKH+nshoZMw0CmxnRGFsVr25+J/npRDe+JmIkxR4zJaLwlRiUHj+Px4KzRnIqSWUaWFvxWxMNWVgUyrZEMjqy+uk06gTt04eSKXp5nEU0Rk6R1VE0D VqonvUQm3EkELP6BW9OeC8OO/Ox7K14OQzp+gPnM8f+oKPBA==</latexit>
Figure 1. A stable convention for the roommates’ problem if δ ≥ 1/2.
The off-path behavior satisfies the same credibility as that on the path of play: when Alice and
Carol are meant to match forever, Alice is punished in the future if she chooses to deviate with
Bob. In this manner, the automaton depicted in Figure 1 guarantees that no coalition wishes to
deviate when players are sufficiently patient.
This example illustrates how a repeated matching environment has a stable convention even
if the static one-shot environment lacks one, where the match in each period is enforced through
future history-dependent matches.9 The rule specified above is not the only stable convention;
in fact, every feasible payoff vector in the above game (if players are sufficiently patient) may
be enforced through some configuration of carrots and sticks. However, if players can make
side-payments that cannot be conditioned upon in future play, every convention is unstable and
undermined by some scheme of coalitional deviations and secret side-payments.
2.2 Dividing a Dollar with a Veto Player
Here, we illustrate our results using a simple game (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1945): con-
sider a divide-the-dollar game between three players—1, 2, and 3—where {1, 2} and {1, 3} can
pass any division of the dollar, but the coalition of {2, 3} is powerless (as is any singleton).10 Here,
player 1 is an elite veto player who needs the support of one other (non-elite) player to capture
the surplus. The core of this stage game involves player 1 capturing the entire dollar; every other
allocation guarantees that she and one other player has a profitable joint deviation.
History-dependence in a repeated bargaining problem can do more. Suppose that now, in
9Our rule shares similarities with previous dynamic resolutions. In a stochastic game where the state-variable is
the previous period’s chosen coalition structure, Konishi and Ray (2003) construct stable processes where the coali-
tional structure cycles stochastically when players are patient. Looking at a game without discounting, Vartiainen
(2011) constructs an absorbing history-dependent process that shares a similar spirit to ours.
10Ray and Vohra (2015b) and Dutta and Vohra (2017) also use this example to illustrate their approaches; we
thank Elliot Lipnowski for suggesting that we do so.
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every period, there is a dollar to be divided, and group behavior can condition on past alloca-
tions, whether any coalition blocked, etc. Similar to Nash-reversion equilibria of repeated non-
cooperative games, we use a “core-reversion” convention to enforce more here.
Consider a convention that recommends the allocation
(
0, 1
2
, 1
2
)
every period so long as that
has been the division in every prior period, and recommends the core of the stage game in any
other history. Now, even if player 1 offers the entire dollar to either player 2 or 3, neither is willing
to join her in blocking this outcome if δ ≥ 1
2
:
(1− δ)(1) + δ(0) ≤ 1
2
,
where the LHS is player 2’s (or 3’s) deviation payoff from being promised the entire surplus today
and reverting to the core of the stage game from tomorrow onwards, and the RHS is her payoff
from continuing on the path of play.
Going further, core-reversion can support any allocation in the triangle formed by the vertices
{(2δ−1, 1−δ, 1−δ), (0, δ, 1−δ), (0, 1−δ, δ)}, which converges to the entire unit simplex as δ → 1.
This is depicted in Figure 2 below. In Section 5, we show how one can do more both in this
example and more generally across a large class of simple games by using approaches from Abreu
(1988) and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to characterize the full set of supportable payoffs
for fixed discount factors.
By contrast, our anti-folk theorem result implies that once coalitions can make secret transfers,
then the only supportable outcome is the core of the stage game, where the elite veto player
captures the entire surplus.
Figure 2. Supportable payoffs using core-reversion if δ ≥ 12 .
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3 The Power of Conventions: Perfect Monitoring
This section describes our framework and results when monitoring is perfect. For expositional
clarity, we first describe implications for non-transferable utility environments, and then introduce
perfectly observed transfers.
3.1 A Non-Transferable Utility Environment
A set of players N ≡ {1, 2 . . . , n} interact repeatedly at t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., and share a common
discount factor δ < 1. Players can make choices as individuals and as coalitions. The set of
possible coalitions is the set of all nonempty subsets of N , denoted by C.
The Stage Game: We consider a non-transferable utility (henceforth NTU) stage game using
the language of cooperative game theory. Let A be the set of alternatives, which is finite. An
alternative a generates a payoff vector v(a) ≡ (v1(a), . . . , vn(a)) ∈ Rn, and we use v : A → Rn to
denote the payoff function. Using the language of Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1994), we sometimes
focus on settings where no two players have perfectly aligned preferences and call these “games
with nonequivalent utilities.”
Definition 1. The stage game satisfies nonequivalent utilities (NEU) if there is no pair of
players {i, j}, and constants k and λ > 0 such that vi(a) = k + λvj(a) for all a ∈ A.
In each period, the convention recommends an alternative, and feasible deviations for coalitions
and individuals are defined relative to that recommendation. If a in A is recommended, then
coalitions can decide whether to block the recommendation. If coalition C chooses to block the
recommendation, it can deviate to any alternative in EC(a). If no coalition chooses to block, then
the recommendation is implemented. The correspondence EC : A⇒ A is coalition C’s effectivity
correspondence, as in Rosenthal (1972). We assume the following about these correspondences:
Assumption 1. (Reflexivity) For every coalition C and alternative a, a ∈ EC(a).
Assumption 2. (Omnipotence of the Grand Coalition). For all a ∈ A, EN(a) = A.
Assumption 1 guarantees that a coalition can block an outcome without necessarily changing
the alternative; this assumption is used when we later augment the game with transfers. Assump-
tion 2 guarantees that it is feasible for the grand coalition to deviate and choose any alternative.
All of these assumptions are satisfied in a number of settings commonly studied in the literature,
as we illustrate below.
Example 1. Consider a strategic-form game in which each player’s action set is Ai, the set of
action profiles is A ≡ A1 × . . .× An. The effectivity correspondence is
EC(a) ≡
{
a′ ∈ A : a′j = aj for all j /∈ C
}
,
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modeling the possibility for a deviating coalition to choose action profiles in which players outside
the coalition do not change their actions. This formulation extends the standard definition for
individual deviations (used to define Nash equilibria) to a coalitional environment.
Example 2. Consider a general NTU coalitional or characteristic function game (N,U) where the
mapping U(C) ⊆ R|C| specifies a set of feasible payoff vectors for coalition C if it forms. Let P be
the set of all partitions of N and pi be a generic partition. Now let an alternative a = (pi, u) where pi
is a partition and u is a feasible payoff vector given that partition. The effectivity correspondence
EC(a) specifies the set of alternatives to which coalition C may move,
11 and the payoff function
is v((pi, u)) = u.
Example 3. Suppose, as in Bernheim and Slavov (2009), that individuals vote in each period over
a set of alternatives. LetW be the set of coalitions that have at least ⌈N
2
⌉
players. The effectivity
correspondence specifies that for every a, EC(a) = A if C ∈ W , and otherwise, EC(a) = {a}.
Outcomes, Histories, and Paths: At the end of each period, the feasible outcome o ≡ (a, C)
specifies the chosen alternative and the identity of the blocking coalition (if any). We denote the
set of feasible outcomes in this NTU environment by ONTU ≡ A × C. When referring to past
outcomes, we denote the alternative chosen in period t by at and the blocking coalition in period
t by Ct, where Ct = ∅ if the recommendation in period t was unblocked.12
A t-period history is a sequence ht ≡ (aτ , Cτ )τ=0,1,2,...,t−1, that specifies alternatives and block-
ing coalitions for t periods. We denote the set of all feasible t-length histories by Ht for t ≥ 1,
and H0 = {∅} for the singleton comprising the initial null history. We denote by H ≡ ⋃∞t=0Ht the
set of all feasible histories. An outcome path is an infinite sequence p ≡ (at, Ct)t=0,1,2,..., specifying
alternatives and blocking coalitions for each of infinitely many periods.
Plans and Conventions: A plan recommends an outcome following each history: a plan is a
mapping σ : H → ONTU . We denote the alternative and a blocking coalition recommended by
a plan σ after history h by a(h|σ) and C(h|σ). A convention is a plan that recommends only
outcomes that are unblocked: in other words, σ : H → A× {∅}.
Payoffs: For a path p = (at, Ct)t=0,1,2,..., Ui(p) ≡ (1 − δ)
∑∞
t=0 δ
tvi(a
t) denotes player i’s nor-
malized discounted continuation payoff from that path, where 0 ≤ δ < 1 is the common discount
11It is natural to impose restrictions on this effectivity correspondence. For example, one may require in the
spirit of coalitional sovereignty (Ray and Vohra 2015b) that (i) (pi′, u′) ∈ A is an element of EC((pi, u)) only if C
is a union of members of pi′; and (ii) pi′ has as a member any C ′ such that C ′ ∩ C = ∅ and C ′ ∈ pi.
12Our model assumes that coalitional blocking is observable. If the stage game is a strategic-form game as in
Example 1, then this assumption is unnecessary; instead, it suffices at every stage to punish someone from among
those whose actions depart from the recommendation’s. However, in a general partitional game (e.g., matching),
the alternative itself may not code sufficient information about who deviated. We abstract from this monitoring
imperfection, and as in the closely related papers (Hyndman and Ray 2007; Vartiainen 2011; Dutta and Vartiainen
2019), assume that the identity of the blocking coalition is directly observed.
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factor. For a plan σ and after history h, let P (h|σ) ≡ (σ(h), σ(h, σ(h)), . . .) denote the path
generated recursively by σ after that history, and Ui(h|σ) denote player i’s payoff from that path.
3.2 A Definition of Stable Conventions
In this section, we define our notion of stability. For comparison, we begin with the conventional
notion for the stage game:
Definition 2. An alternative a is a core-alternative if there exists no coalition C and alternative
a′ ∈ EC(a) such that for every i in C, vi(a′) > vi(a). A payoff vector v˜ is in the core of the NTU
stage game if there exists a core-alternative a such that v˜ = v(a).
The core focuses attention on alternatives where no coalition gains from blocking. Our dynamic
solution-concept elaborates on the core in a straightforward way: we say that a convention is
stable if after every history, no coalition unanimously prefers blocking the recommendation today,
assuming that the future unfolds as anticipated by the convention.
Definition 3. A convention σ is stable in the NTU repeated game if for every history h,
there exists no coalition C and feasible deviation a′ ∈ EC(a(h|σ)) such that
For every i ∈ C: (1− δ)vi(a′) + δUi(h, a′, C|σ) > Ui(h|σ). (1)
In other words, no coalition has a profitable one-shot deviation.
The requirement for stability is that at every history and given future play, no coalition finds
it profitable to block today. Coalitions anticipate that their choices today affect continuation
play and a stable convention ensures that at least one member of each coalition finds the long-
run cost of changing the path of play to outweigh her instantaneous gain from deviating.13 Thus,
players’ shared understanding of the future—formalized through the convention—deters coalitional
deviations today.
An alternative way to express the idea is that a stable convention recommends only core-
alternatives of the reduced normal-form game at every history (whose payoffs are a convex com-
bination of today’s payoffs and continuation values). If δ = 0, that reduced normal-form game
collapses to the stage game and so stable conventions necessarily implement only core-alternatives
of the stage game. One may proceed further with this connection. Suppose that a∗ is a core-
alternative, and consider a convention that prescribes a∗ after every history. Such a convention
is stable because behavior today does not impact continuation play, and in every period, no
coalition gains myopically from deviating. The converse is also true: every “Markov” stable
13Our requirement for profitability is that every coalition member strictly gains from blocking. Alternatively,
one could stipulate that every coalition member is weakly better off and at least one is strictly better off. Our main
results are identical with this alternative definition.
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convention—i.e., that in which the prescription does not depend on past play—can implement
only core-alternatives. Thus, the relationship between a stable convention of the repeated game
and the core of the stage game is analogous to that between sub-game perfect equilibria of the
repeated game and the Nash equilibria of the corresponding stage game.
As mentioned before, our notion of a stable convention builds on important precursors. Konishi
and Ray (2003) consider a recursive payoff similar to that in Definition 3 in a stochastic game where
players condition on the current coalitional structure (but not on past history). Vartiainen (2011)
augments this solution-concept to allow for history-dependence and studies a setting without
discounting. In the context of repeated elections, Bernheim and Slavov (2009) study Dynamic
Condorcet Winners, which coincides with stable conventions when we specialize our stage game
to their’s.
3.3 What Can Be Enforced By Stable Conventions?
The previous section defined stable conventions. Here, we turn to the limits of their enforceability.
We establish that for NTU games, every payoff that is feasible and “individually” rational can be
implemented in a stable convention, if players are sufficiently patient.
Analogous to the (pure-action) minmax of noncooperative repeated games, let us define each
player’s minmax payoff as the lowest payoff that she attains when she has the opportunity to
best-respond to the recommendation:
vi ≡ min
a∈A
max
a′∈E{i}(a)
vi(a
′). (Player i’s minmax)
Based on this minmax payoff, let us define the set of feasible and strictly individually rational
payoffs. The set of feasible payoffs is V† ≡ co({v˜ ∈ Rn : ∃a ∈ A such that v˜ = v(a)}) where co(S)
is the convex hull of a set of payoff profiles S, and the subset of these payoffs that is strictly
individually rational is
V†IR ≡
{
v ∈ V† : vi > vi for every i = 1, . . . , n
}
. (NTU Feasible IR)
With this in place, we state our first set of results.
Theorem 1. For every δ ≥ 0, every stable convention gives each player i a payoff of at least vi.
Moreover, if the stage game satisfies NEU, then for every v ∈ V†IR, there is a δ < 1 such that for
every δ ∈ (δ, 1), there exists a stable convention with a discounted payoff equal to v.
The statement of the folk theorem is nearly identical to that for sub-game perfect equilibria
(Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; Abreu, Dutta and Smith 1994), with the differences being that
we permit coalitional deviations, and do not limit our analysis to repeated play of a strategic-
form game. Nevertheless, payoffs that are strictly individually rational can be sustained, and
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the possibility for coalitional deviations does not refine the set of sustainable outcomes. The key
conceptual idea is that to deter coalitional deviations, it suffices to punish only a single constituent
of each coalition—a “scapegoat”—as if she were a sole deviator.14
We discuss the key steps. A convention is stable if no coalition, even those that are singletons
(i.e., individuals), has profitable one-shot deviations. An implication of the standard one-shot
deviation principle then is that no individual has a profitable multi-shot deviation. This property
implies that no player can be pushed to below her individual minmax because otherwise she
can profitably deviate. The second part of the result uses the NEU condition to construct player-
specific punishments to deter individual deviations, and as mentioned above, identical punishments
are used to deter coalitional deviations. Finally, because we have not augmented our model with
a public correlation device, we use sequences of play (as in Sorin 1986 and Fudenberg and Maskin
1991) to achieve payoffs that are in the convex hull of generated payoffs.
3.4 Transferable Utility with Perfect Monitoring
This section augments the game with perfectly observed transfers. We model transfers sepa-
rately from collective choices to sharpen the contrast to the secret transfers case. We begin with
preliminaries to define the game before stating our results.
We describe transfers using T ≡ [Tij]i,j∈N where Tij ∈ [0,∞) is the non-negative utility that is
transferred to player j from player i. Let T denote the set of all n×n matrices with non-negative
entries. We use Ti = [Tij]j∈N to denote the vector of transfers paid by player i. Let TC = [Ti]i∈C
be the transfers paid by members of coalition C and T−C = [Ti]i/∈C be transfers paid by members
outside coalition C. Transfers modify payoffs in the usual way: a player’s experienced payoff is
the sum of her generated payoff and net transfers. That is ui(a, T ) ≡ vi(a)+
∑
j∈N Tji−
∑
j∈N Tij.
A feasible outcome of the stage game now specifies the chosen alternative, the identity of
a blocking coalition (if any), and the chosen transfers. We denote the set of feasible outcomes
by OTU ≡
{
o = (a, C, T )|a ∈ A,C ∈ C, T ∈ T
}
. Histories and paths are defined as in NTU
stage games, with (a, C, T ) replacing (a, C) whenever needed to account for transfers. A plan
σ : H → OTU specifies an outcome, including transfers, based on history. We continue to use
a(h|σ) and C(h|σ) to denote the recommended alternative and blocking coalition in σ(h), and in
addition, we use T (h|σ) to denote the transfers in σ(h). As before, a convention recommends only
outcomes that have empty blocking coalitions; in other words, σ : H → A× {∅} × T .
If coalition C blocks a recommended outcome (a, ∅, T ), it can choose any a′ in EC(A), and
change its transfer schedule to any T ′C so that the realized outcome is (a
′, C, T ′C , T−C). This
formulation assumes that when a coalition blocks, it still accept incoming transfers from outside
14The logic of Theorem 1 indicates that it would apply even if coalitions could commit to a sequence of deviations
across histories, where the maximal number of deviations is bounded. We do not model this scenario explicitly
because a profitable finite long-run deviation for a coalition must either involve a profitable one-shot deviation or
call for an individual within the coalition to deviate even if that’s not in her interest.
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the blocking coalition who do not know of the block at the time at which transfers are paid.
This assumption is inessential to our results, and is assumed for notational convenience; identical
results follow if one were to instead assume that blocking coalitions must achieve budget-balance.
Since the game has been augmented with transfers, we re-define the set of feasible and in-
dividually rational payoffs. Potential experienced payoff profiles after alternative a is chosen is
U(a) = {u ∈ Rn : ∑i∈N ui = ∑i∈N vi(a)}, its convex hull is U † ≡ co(∪a∈A U(a)), and the set of
feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs is
U †IR ≡
{
u ∈ U † : ui > vi for every i = 1, . . . , n
}
. (TU Feasible IR)
Players have preferences over the discounted stream of experienced payoffs. The definition of
Ui(p), P (h|σ) and Ui(h|σ) are modified in the obvious way to reflect the influence of transfers
on experienced payoff. To avoid Ponzi schemes, for all of our results, we restrict attention to
conventions whose continuation values lie in a bounded set.
Assumption 3. We consider conventions σ such that continuation values are bounded across
histories: {u ∈ Rn : ∃h ∈ H such that U(h|σ) = u} is a bounded subset of Rn.
With these preliminaries defined, we can extend the notion of a stable convention to allow for
perfectly observed transfers.
Definition 4. A convention σ is stable in the TU repeated game if for every history h, there
exists no coalition C, alternative a′ ∈ EC(a(h|σ)), and transfers T ′C = [T ′ij]i∈C,j∈N , such that for
every i in C,
(1− δ)ui(a′, [T ′C , T−C(h|σ)]) + δUi(h, a′, C, [T ′C , T−C(h|σ)]|σ) > Ui(h|σ) (2)
Because transfers are publicly observed, subsequent behavior may be conditioned on these
transfers when coalition C blocks the recommended outcome. We use this tool to prove a folk
theorem analogous to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. For every δ ≥ 0, every stable convention gives each player i a payoff of at least vi.
For every u ∈ U †IR, there is a δ such that for every δ ∈ (δ, 1), there exists a stable convention with
a discounted payoff equal to u.
The proof for Theorem 2 is similar to that of Theorem 1. Transfers ensure that players have
opposed interests in the stage game, so NEU in this augmented game is automatically satisfied.
The complication introduced by transfers is that if the deviating coalition C anticipates a certain
member to be punished, other members can transfer utility to her to compensate for the sub-
sequent punishment. These transfers can potentially undermine the deterrence effect of future
continuation, even as δ → 1. To overcome this problem, the convention targets the player who
gained least from the deviation after transfers are made.
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4 Secret Transfers Undermine Conventions
We see in Section 3.4 that side-payments alone do not undermine the power of expectations: by
punishing players for giving or receiving transfers, the convention ensures that coalitions do not
deviate. In this section, we see a different conclusion emerges once coalitions can make secret side-
payments. Section 4.1 describes the secret-transfers setting that we analyze. Section 4.2 proves
a one-shot coalitional deviation principle. Section 4.3 proves our result that each coalition can
guarantee itself a coalitional minmax value. Section 4.4 establishes our formal result connecting
behavior to the efficient β-core.
4.1 The Setup
We say that transfers are secret when the convention cannot condition on the amount of those
payments. In other words, the future can depend on the identity of blocking coalitions as well as
alternatives they’ve chosen but not on the amount of bribes and side-payments they have paid
to one another. Our analysis isolates this monitoring imperfection as being critical in a repeated
coalitional setting.
This form of secrecy is a measurability restriction. Consider two (t + 1)-length histories h =
(a0, C0, T 0, . . . , at, Ct, T t) and h˜ = (a˜0, C˜0, T˜ 0, . . . , a˜t, C˜t, T˜ t). We say that h and h˜ are identical
up to transfers within blocking coalitions if they are of the same length, and the alternative
chosen, the identity of the blocking coalition if any, and transfers made outside the blocking
coalition are all identical across these two histories:
For every 0 ≤ τ ≤ t: aτ = a˜τ , Cτ = C˜τ , T−Cτ = T˜−C˜τ .
In other words, the only potential difference between histories h and h˜ is in the transfers made
within blocking coalitions. This is the information that we model as being secret from the con-
vention.
Definition 5. A convention σ respects secret transfers if σ(h) = σ(h′) for any h, h′ ∈ H that
are identical up to transfers within blocking coalitions.
A stable convention that respects secret transfers is one that satisfies both Definitions 4 and 5.15
To be transparent about what Definition 5 entails: because players outside blocking coalitions do
not observe transfers within a blocking coalition, their actions cannot condition on them. Def-
inition 5 also assumes that members of blocking coalitions do not condition their subsequent
equilibrium play on the transfers made within the blocking coalition. This measurability re-
striction may be stronger than secrecy, but we view there to be several rationales for it. First,
15A special case of a convention that respects secret transfers is one that ignores transfers altogether between
any pair (blocking or otherwise).
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this restriction is analogous to that of perfect public equilibria in repeated games with public
monitoring (Mailath and Samuelson 2006) where all players condition their play on publicly ob-
servable variables. Second, one may envision that mechanisms or continuation play that attempt
to elicit private information from deviators (about their transfers) might themselves be vulnerable
to coalitional deviations, so it’s unclear that information about transfers can be credibly elicited
from members of a blocking coalition. Third, secret transfers generate persistent private informa-
tion, and it is beyond the scope of existing tools to characterize coalitional behavior that is both
dynamic and conditions on persistent private information. Given all of these reasons, we view this
to be a useful starting point to investigate how coalitions may use secret side-payments.16
4.2 A One-Shot Coalitional Deviation Principle
Our central result is that secret transfers are a destabilizing force that undermines intertemporal
incentives, and guarantees that each coalition obtains its coalitional minmax value. At the core of
this result is a one-shot coalitional deviation principle: we prove that for conventions that respect
secret transfers, the existence of a profitable multi-shot coalitional deviation implies that of a
profitable one-shot coalitional deviation. Hence, any stable convention in this setting must also
be immune to profitable multi-shot coalitional deviations.
We begin by defining multi-shot coalitional deviations. A multi-shot coalitional deviation is a
plan that departs from the convention that is also feasible for the coalition: C is solely responsible
for any deviations at any history, and the deviation (in terms of the alternative and transfers) at
any history must be feasible for coalition C.
Definition 6. A multi-shot deviation by coalition C from convention σ is a distinct plan
σ′ : H → OTU such that for any history h ∈ H where σ′(h) = (a′, C ′, T ′) 6= σ(h), it must be
that C ′ = C, a′ ∈ EC(a(h|σ)) and T ′−C = T−C(h|σ). A multi-shot deviation σ′ by coalition C is
profitable if there exists a history h such that Ui(h|σ′) > Ui(h|σ) for all i ∈ C.
With these preliminaries defined, we prove the following result.
Lemma 1. (One-shot Coalitional Deviation Principle). Under secret transfers, a conven-
tion σ is stable if and only if it has no profitable multi-shot coalitional deviations.
This result has important implications. A challenge central to coalitional behavior is that they
cannot commit to long-term deviations, and thus, can be potentially defeated by the power of
expectations. Lemma 1 establishes that once coalitions can make secret transfers to each other,
such long-term commitments are no longer needed: if a coalition can jointly gain from a long-term
commitment to a multi-shot deviation, they can structure their short-term deviations alongside
16Our approach is similar to that of collusion in mechanism design (Mookherjee 2006) where details of the
side-contract is unobservable and cannot be conditioned on by the Principal.
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transfers to obtain those gains.17 Being able to bribe other players to join one’s coalition and to not
be punished for it is an important tool that can protect coalitions from the power of intertemporal
incentives.18
Sketch of Proof: The “if” direction is true by definition. For the “only if” direction, suppose
as a contrapositive that there is a profitable multi-shot deviation. Our steps below construct a
profitable one-shot coalitional deviation using the following steps:
a. Since every member of C has a higher utility from that deviation path, it must be that the
sum of the members’ utilities is also higher.
b. Now treat the coalition C as a hypothetical player whose payoff is the sum of payoffs of
members of coalition C. The standard argument establishes that this profitable multi-shot
deviation is reducible to a profitable one-shot deviation for this hypothetical entity.
c. Under secret transfers, coalition C’s gains in total value from that one-shot deviation can
be freely distributed among its members using intra-coalition transfers when the coalition
blocks, without affecting continuation play. Thus, there is a one-shot coalitional deviation
that is profitable for every member of coalition C, and therefore, σ is unstable.
4.3 Coalitional Payoff Guarantees: An Anti-Folk Theorem
We use the one-shot coalitional deviation principle to prove that in a stable convention, for every
discount factor, each coalition can guarantee itself a total payoff below which it cannot be pushed
down to by the convention. We define this coalitional minmax as follows:
vC ≡ min
a∈A
max
a′∈EC(a)
∑
i∈C
vi(a
′). (Coalition C’s minmax)
The coalitional minmax builds on standard individual minmaxes in a natural way, treating coali-
tion C as a hypothetical entity whose total value is the sum of the payoffs of its constituents,
and with an ability to best-respond represented by EC(·). This minmax corresponds to the β-
characteristic function proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1945) (see also Luce and
Raiffa 1957 and Ray 2007) that assumes that those outside a blocking coalition act in ways to
minimize the total value of those within it.19 We argue that each coalition can guarantees itself
17We have described Lemma 1 in a setting where every blocking coalition can make secret transfers. An analogous
coalition-specific result holds in a more general setting where only some coalitions can make secret transfers; for
those coalitions, the one-shot coalitional deviation principle applies.
18In closely related work, Barron and Guo (2019) illustrate how secret transfers can destroy the power of
relational contracting between a long-run agent and a sequence of short-run opponents, and cooperation may be
restored when those transfers are observable. Our results are complementary in that the economic channel here is
that of side-payments that evade punishment whereas they study the issue of extortion.
19One subtle difference is that the β-characteristic function is often used to convert a strategic-form game into
a cooperative game. We are preserving the same logic, but applying it to an abstract transferable utility game,
19
at least this value.
Theorem 3. Under secret transfers, for every δ ≥ 0, every stable convention gives each coalition
C a total value of at least vC.
The argument for Theorem 3 has a straightforward conceptual structure. If a convention
σ could push a coalition down to a total value strictly less than vC , then we can construct a
profitable multi-shot deviation by members of coalition C. By Lemma 1, there then exists a
profitable one-shot coalitional deviation, which implies that σ is not stable.20
We view Theorem 3 as an Anti-Folk Theorem. In a general cooperative game without exter-
nalities, vC corresponds to the value of coalition C given by its characteristic function. Thus, in
such cases, stable conventions can implement payoffs only in the core of the stage game. More
generally, when externalities are present, our result guarantees that payoffs supported by a sta-
ble convention are a subset of the β-core (i.e., the core when the characteristic function is the
β-characteristic function defined above). In certain cases, the set of payoffs where each coalition
obtains at least its minmax value is empty. We do not view this as a negative conclusion, but
rather as a stark illustration of how short-term coalitional deviations coupled with the ability to
make side-payments secretly severely erodes the power of conventions.21
Because the grand coalition must also achieve its coalitional minmax, and is omnipotent (As-
sumption 2), Theorem 3 also implies that stable conventions implement only efficient alternatives.
We hesitate to interpret this as a positive result for the (usual) reason that the active players
modeled in a game may not include all those whose utilities are relevant for welfare-evaluation.
For example, if all of the active players are firms (or political leaders)—and not consumers (or
citizens)—one may not be sanguine about those active players being able to effectively collude to
maximize their payoffs.
4.4 The Efficient β-Core
We use the idea that only efficient alternatives are selected to derive a tighter result. Let us denote
the efficient alternatives by A ≡ arg maxa∈A
∑
i∈N vi(a). We define efficient coalitional minmaxes
as the lowest payoff that a coalition can be pushed down to using only efficient alternatives:
veC ≡ min
a∈A
max
a′∈EC(a)
∑
i∈C
vi(a
′). (3)
including those that lack a product-structure.
20We note that Theorem 3 applies even if the convention uses a public randomization device: for every realization
of the public randomization device, coalition C can guarantee itself a total payoff of at least vC with a multi-shot
deviation that best-responds to the recommendation. Because Lemma 1 still applies, a stable convention then
cannot push a coalition’s value below this minmax.
21This issue would not arise in the absence of the possibility for coalitional deviations. In a standard repeated
strategic-form game, augmenting the game with transfers that are made simultaneously with actions could only
expand and not reduce the set of supportable payoffs.
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Naturally, for every coalition C, veC is weakly higher than vC , since the restriction to using efficient
alternatives diminishes the capability of the convention to punish coalitions. With this in mind,
let us define the efficient β-core:
Definition 7. The efficient β-core is the set
B ≡
{
u ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
ui = max
a∈A
∑
i∈N
vi(a),
∑
i∈C
ui ≥ veC for all C 6= N
}
,
and the strict efficient β-core is the set
Bs ≡
{
u ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
ui = max
a∈A
∑
i∈N
vi(a),
∑
i∈C
ui > v
e
C for all C 6= N
}
.
The efficient β-core is the set of efficient payoffs that gives each coalition at least its efficient
coalitional minmax. The strict efficient β-core is in the relative interior of the efficient β-core,
where each non-grand coalition obtains strictly more than its efficient coalitional minmax. We
prove the following result below.
Theorem 4. Under secret transfers, for every δ ≥ 0, every stable convention implements payoffs
only within the efficient β-core. If the strict efficient β-core is non-empty, then for every payoff
profile u ∈ Bs, there is a δ < 1 such that for every δ ∈ (δ, 1), there exists a stable convention with
a discounted payoff equal to u.
This result is a tight folk theorem for the setting with secret transfers: the set of payoff
profiles supportable by stable conventions is a subset of the efficient β-core; moreover, any payoff
profile within the strict efficient β-core is supportable so long as players are sufficiently patient.
Accordingly, our result offers a connection between the efficient β-core and payoffs sustained by
stable conventions.
The argument for the first part of the result mirrors Theorem 3, but now embedding the re-
striction that stable conventions can select only efficient alternatives. The second part of the result
treats each coalition—apart from the grand coalition—as a hypothetical player, and constructs
“player-specific” punishments for these hypothetical players.22 Once these “player-specific” pun-
ishments are generated, we use an argument analogous to that of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
(and Theorems 1 and 2) to push each of these hypothetical player arbitrarily close to its efficient
coalitional minmax.
22While we do this step directly, one can see that this is feasible because the payoffs of these coalitions satisfy
the NEU condition in the game augmented with transfers.
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5 An Application to Simple Games
Here, we specialize our analysis to simple games (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1945), re-
visiting and generalizing our analysis of the example in Section 2.2. Simple games are problems
of pure division where certain winning coalitions have the rights to allocate a fixed surplus, and
the question of interest is seeing how that surplus is divided. Simple games are relevant both for
cooperative games (Ray and Vohra 2015b; Dutta and Vohra 2017) and are extensively studied in
the vast literature on legislative bargaining that builds on Baron and Ferejohn (1989) (see Eraslan
and Evdokimov 2019 for a survey).
We study a particular sub-class of simple games: namely those games where no single player is
a dictator, but some are political elites. We ask the following questions. First, for fixed discount
factors, to what degree can history-dependence support outcomes where political elites share their
resources with non-elites? Second, what happens when coalitions can make secret transfers?
To apply our approach, let us re-formulate simple games in the language of our model. The
set of alternatives is the division of a dollar among n players: A ≡ {a ∈ RN+ :
∑
i∈N ai = 1},
where player i’s generated payoff from alternative a is vi(a) ≡ ai. Some coalitions have the ability
to affect the outcome whereas others do not: let W be the set of winning coalitions, where each
winning coalition C in W has the ability to choose how the dollar is divided, and each losing
coalition C /∈ W does not. Formally, for each a, EC(a) = A if C ∈ W , and EC(a) = {a}
otherwise. As is standard, we assume that W is monotonic and proper.23
To define political elites, we call player i a veto player if she is a member of every winning
coalition. The collection of all veto players—referred to as the collegium—is D ≡ ∩C∈WC, and
a collegial game is that in which D is non-empty. Our analysis studies collegial games that are
non-dictatorial; in other words, every winning coalition has at least two members.
Non-dictatorial collegial games are of interest to political economy because it models relatively
common settings where there is at least one veto player, but that veto player does not have
complete power (e.g. Winter 1996; McCarty 2000a,b). One example is the interaction between a
legislative body and an executive leader with veto power where neither body can pass a proposal
on its own. Another example corresponds to organizations (e.g., the UN Security Council) where
some members have veto power but the support of some non-veto players is also needed. Finally,
power-sharing arrangements that resemble clientelism and patronage (Francois, Rainer and Trebbi
2015) often require the support of certain elites and sufficient support from non-elite citizens.
While non-elites may have de jure power in all of these cases—e.g., if the set of veto players, D,
is not itself a winning coalition—they have no de facto power when interacting only once. Indeed,
the core of the stage game involves elites sharing all of the surplus among themselves, and not at
all with non-veto players. Our interest is in comparing that outcome with what can be sustained
through stable conventions when the players interact repeatedly.
23In other words, if C ∈ W and C ′ ⊇ C, then C ′ ∈ W. Also, C ∈ W implies that N\C /∈ W.
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We have already seen in Section 2.2 how history-dependence can sustain a larger set of outcomes
by using reversion to the stage-game core as a punishment. Here, we consider a broader class
of conventions and punishments, using approaches from Abreu (1988) and Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti (1990).24 We prove the following result. (Below, ∆ refers to the non-negative n-
dimensional unit simplex.)
Theorem 5. Under perfect monitoring, with or without transfers:
a. If there are at least two veto players, the set of supportable payoffs are those that give the set
of veto players at least 1− δ of the surplus:
U(δ) ≡
{
u ∈ ∆ :
∑
i∈D
ui ≥ 1− δ
}
.
b. If there is only a single veto player, there exists δ such that the set of supportable payoffs is
U(δ) for δ > δ.
By contrast, when transfers are secret, the set of supportable outcomes, regardless of δ, is the core
of the stage game: K ≡ {u ∈ ∆ : ∑i∈D ui = 1.}.
Theorem 5 says that when monitoring is perfect, then with and without transfers, all sup-
portable payoffs give at least (1 − δ) to the veto players and at most δ to non-veto players. As
players become more patient, then non-veto players can capture larger shares of the surplus in
stable conventions. By contrast, with secret transfers, the veto players capture the entire surplus,
returning to the core of the stage game.
These results illustrate the importance of institutions that monitor bribes and side-payments.
When all behavior is publicly observable, elite players can be motivated to share their surplus
with non-elite players. However, that ability is lost once elite players can co-opt others with secret
side-payments.
To prove Theorem 5, we consider optimal penal codes that feature the worst possible punish-
ment for players, namely giving them 0. However, our coalitional setting introduces a subtlety
absent in standard repeated games. In standard repeated games, after a player deviates, contin-
uation play can condition only on the identity of the deviator without being sensitive to how she
deviated (Abreu 1988). By contrast, in our setting, if a coalition deviates, being sensitive to how
it does so is important for constructing the optimal penal code.
Figure 3 illustrates these results by revisiting our example in Section 2.2: this is a 3-player
divide-the-dollar game where player 1 is a veto player. Figure 3(A) illustrates the set of support-
able payoffs for perfect monitoring, with and without transfers. The red region depicts payoffs
24To simplify exposition, we consider only those conventions that are stationary on the path of play. We
conjecture that this is without loss of generality, particularly in our results for settings with transfers.
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(A) Perfect monitoring for δ > 1/2 (B) Secret transfers between 1 and 2
Figure 3. (A) depicts the set of supportable outcomes with perfect monitoring. (B) depicts how secret transfers
reduces the set of supportable outcomes once coalition {1, 2} can make secret transfers.
supported by core-reversion, and the blue region illustrates the gains that come from using the
approach here. We see that the region of supportable payoffs expands to all those that give each
of players 2 and 3 less than δ. Figure 3(B) illustrates how once coalition {1, 2} can make secret
transfers, the set of supportable payoffs reduces to those where player 3 is completely excluded
and obtains 0.25 If all coalitions can make secret transfers, then the only supportable payoff is the
core of the stage game.
6 Conclusion
This paper models self-enforcing conventions for repeated games in which coalitions can commit to
short-term deviations but not long-term behavior. We investigate the degree to which the motive
to deviate as coalitions is disciplined by players’ shared understanding of the future. We find that
when all behavior is perfectly observed, then stable conventions can support every feasible and
strictly individually rational payoff vector, so the possibility for coalitional deviations comes at
little cost when players are patient. By contrast, if coalitions can make secret transfers to each
other, then they can guarantee themselves a minimal “coalitional minmax” value regardless of
players’ patience. In cooperative games without externalities, the set of supportable payoffs is
then reduced to the core of the stage game; without externalities, the set is a subset of the β-core.
We view our results to have both theoretical and applied import. On the theoretical side, our
framework and solution-concept offer a tractable merger of important ideas in cooperative and
repeated games. Because we model an abstract stage game, which includes both strategic-form
25While our formal results do not cover this case, it is straightforward to extend Lemma 1 and Theorem 3 to
argue that if a coalition can make secret transfers, then it obtains its coalitional minmax regardless of whether
other coalitions can make secret transfers.
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and partitional games, our approach can be used to think both about repeated cooperative games
as well as coalitional deviations in repeated noncooperative games. The recursive nature of our
solution-concept makes it feasible to analyze the set of supportable payoffs in applications using
standard self-generation techniques.
On the applied side, we view our results as speaking to important issues of enforcing law, power,
and social order. An important consideration in the design of legal and political institutions is
the degree to which the temptation to violate the law or abuse political power is disciplined by
players’ expectations of how these actions affect the future. Our results suggest that monitoring
side-payments is critical for the credibility of enforcement: in settings where players can secretly
bribe others, they are less threatened by the prospect of future punishment.
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A Appendix
A.1 Outline and Preliminaries
This main appendix contains the proofs of the Folk Theorem for NTU Games (Theorem 1), the One-Shot
Coalitional Deviation Principle for Secret Transfers (Lemma 1), and the Anti-Folk Theorem for Secret
Transfers (Theorem 3).
The Supplementary Appendix contains proofs for our other results. Some of these arguments share
a similar spirit to those of the above results, but with modifications that address important issues that
arise. The proof of the Folk Theorem for TU Games with perfectly observed transfers (Theorem 2)
mirrors that of Theorem 1 but addresses considerations that involve bounding the amount of transfers
and selecting members of coalitions to punish in a way that cannot be undone through side-payments.
The proof of the result identifying the connection with the efficient β-core (Theorem 4) iterates on the
logic of Theorem 3, uses transfers to construct “coalition-specific” punishments, and then proves the
bounds using an argument similar to Theorem 1.
Below, we exposit notation and a result used throughout our proofs.
Let BRC(a) ≡ arg maxa′∈EC(a)
∑
i∈C vi(a
′) denote coalition C’s best-responses alternatives to a recom-
mended alternative a.
Our analysis uses sequences of play to convexify payoffs, following standard arguments from Sorin (1986)
and Fudenberg and Maskin (1991). Below, we reproduce the statement that we invoke in our arguments.
Lemma 2. (Lemma 2 of Fudenberg and Maskin 1991) Let X be a convex polytope in RN with
vertices x1, . . . , xK . For all  > 0, there exists a δ < 1 such that for all δ < δ < 1, and any x ∈ X,
there exits a sequence {xτ}∞τ=0 drawn from {x1, . . . , xK}, such that (1− δ)
∑∞
τ=0 δ
τxτ = x and at any t,∣∣∣∣x− (1− δ)∑∞τ=t δτ−txτ ∣∣∣∣ < .
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1 on p. 14
Part 1: For every δ ≥ 0, every stable convention gives each player i a payoff of at least vi.
Consider any convention σ and player i such that Ui(∅|σ) < vi. We first show that player i has a profitable
multi-shot deviation from this convention and then use a one-shot deviation principle to show that there
is a profitable one-shot deviation. Therefore σ cannot be stable.
A multi-shot deviation for player i from convention σ is a distinct plan σ′ : H → ONTU such
that for any history h ∈ H where σ′(h) = (a′, C ′) 6= σ(h), it must be that C ′ = {i} and a′ ∈ E{i}(a(h|σ)).
A multi-shot deviation is profitable if there exists a history h such that Ui(h|σ′) > Ui(h|σ).
We consider the following multi-shot deviation: in every period, player i blocks and best-responds
to the convention. Formally, this is a plan σ′ where C(h|σ′) = {i} and a(h|σ′) ∈ BRi
(
a(h|σ)) for every
history h ∈ H. By the definition of vi, the deviation σ′ satisfies vi(a(h|σ′)) ≥ vi for all h ∈ H, so player
i’s continuation value from period 0 must be higher: Ui(∅|σ′) > Ui(∅|σ).
We apply the standard one-shot deviation principle for individual decision making (Blackwell 1965)
to this setting, which is now a simple decision tree.26 Because stage-game payoffs are bounded for player
i and there is discounting, the one-shot deviation principle implies that there exists a history h ∈ H such
that
(1− δ)vi(a(h|σ′)) + δUi
(
h, a(h|σ′), {i}∣∣σ) > Ui(h|σ),
which is a profitable one-shot deviation for coalition {i}. Therefore, σ is unstable.
Part 2: If the stage game satisfies NEU, then for every v ∈ V†IR, there is a δ < 1 such that for every
δ ∈ (δ, 1), there exists a stable convention with discounted payoff equal to v.
Fix v0 ∈ V†IR. We begin with preliminaries, defining payoffs and alternatives to support v0.
First, since the game satisfies NEU, by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 of Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1994),
we can find player-specific punishments for v0: there exist payoff vectors {vi}ni=1 ⊆ V†IR such that vii < v0i
for all i ∈ N , and vji > vii for all j ∈ N, j 6= i. Second, let us define minmaxing alternatives: let
ai ∈ arg mina∈A maxa′∈E{i} vi(a′) be an alternative that can be used to minmax player i. By construction,
it follows that vi(ai) ≤ vi.
Given these payoffs and punishments, let κ ∈ (0, 1) be such that for every κ˜ ∈ [κ, 1], the following is
true for every i:
(1− κ˜)vi(ai) + κ˜vii > vi (4)
For every j 6= i: (1− κ˜)vj(ai) + κ˜vij > (1− κ˜)vj + κ˜vjj (5)
Inequality (4) implies that player i is willing to bear the cost of vi(ai) with the promise of transitioning
into her player-specific punishment rather than staying at her minmax, where the promise is discounted
at κ˜. Similarly, inequality (5) implies that player j is willing to bear the cost of minmaxing player i
26For a statement of the one-shot deviation principle that applies in this context, see
https://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/debraj/Courses/GameTheory2003/Notes/osdp.pdf
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with the promise of transitioning into player i’s specific punishment rather than her own, when the post-
minmaxing phase payoffs are discounted at κ˜. Each inequality holds at κ˜ = 1 for each i and j 6= i. Since
the set of players is finite, there exists a value of κ ∈ (0, 1) such that the inequality holds for all κ˜ ∈ [κ, 1],
i ∈ N and j ∈ N\{i}.
Let L(δ) ≡
⌈
log κ
log δ
⌉
where d·e is the ceiling function. Observe that δL(δ) ∈ [δ log κlog δ , δ log κlog δ+1] = [δκ, κ].
Therefore, limδ→1 δL(δ) = κ.
Lemma 2 guarantees that for any  > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1), there
exist sequences
{{ai,τ}∞τ=0 : i = 0, 1, . . . , n} such that for each i and t, (1 − δ)∑∞τ=0 δτv(ai,τ ) = vi and∣∣∣∣vi − (1− δ)∑∞τ=t δτv(ai,τ )∣∣∣∣ < . We fix an  < (1− κ) min{mini,j 6=i(vji − vii),mini vii − vi}, and given
that , consider δ exceeding the appropriate δ.
We now describe the convention used to sustain v0. Consider the automaton (W,w(0, 0), f, γ), where
• W ≡ {w(d, τ)|0 ≤ d ≤ n, τ ≥ 0} ∪ {w(i, τ)|1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ τ < L(δ)} is the set of possible states;
• w(0, 0) is the initial state;
• f : W → ONTU is the output function, where f(w(d, τ)) = (ad,τ , ∅) and f(w(i, τ)) = (ai, ∅).
• γ : W ×ONTU →W is the transition function. For states of the form w(d, τ), the transition is
γ
(
w(d, τ), (a,C)
)
=
w(j∗, 0) if C 6= ∅ , j∗ = minj∈C jw(d, τ + 1) otherwise
For states in {w(i, τ)|0 ≤ τ < L(δ)− 1},
γ
(
w(i, τ), (a,C)
)
=
w(j∗, 0) if C /∈ {∅, {i}} , j∗ = minj∈C\{i} jw(i, τ + 1) otherwise
For states of the form w(i, L(δ)− 1), the transition is
γ
(
w(i, L(δ)− 1), (a,C)) =
w(j∗, 0) if C /∈ {∅, {i}} , j∗ = minj∈C\{i} jw(i, 0) otherwise
The convention represented by the above automaton yields payoff profile v0. By construction, the con-
tinuation values in different states, V (·), satisfy:∣∣∣∣∣∣vd − V (w(d, τ))∣∣∣∣∣∣ < , τ = 0, 1, . . .
V (w(i, τ)) = (1− δL(δ)−τ )v(ai) + δL(δ)−τV (w(i, 0)), τ = 0, . . . , L(δ)
Below, we show that this convention is stable by showing that there is no profitable one-shot deviation
in any state of this automaton.
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Stability in states of the form w(d, τ): Set B > sup{u∈V†,i∈N} ui. Consider a one-shot deviation to
(a,C) by coalition C. Let j∗ = min{j ∈ C}. For all τ , j∗ obtains a payoff greater than vdj∗ − . By
deviating, j∗ obtains a payoff less than
(1− δ)B + δVj∗(w(j∗, 0)) = (1− δ)B + δ
[
(1− δL(δ))vj∗(aj∗) + δL(δ)vj
∗
j∗
]
For the deviation to be profitable, everyone in C, including player j∗, must be better off. So the one-shot
deviation is unprofitable if the above term is no more than vdj∗ − . We prove that this is the case both
for j∗ 6= d and j∗ = d.
First consider j∗ 6= d. Observe that
lim
δ→1
(1− δ)B + δ
[
(1− δL(δ))vj∗(aj∗) + δL(δ)vj
∗
j∗
]
= lim
δ→1
[
(1− δL(δ))vj∗(aj∗) + δL(δ)vj
∗
j∗
]
< vj
∗
j∗ ,
where the inequality follows from vj∗(aj∗) ≤ vj < vj
∗
j∗ . Because  by construction is strictly less than
vdj∗ − vj
∗
j∗ , it follows that the deviation payoff is less than v
d
j∗ −  when δ is sufficiently large.
Now suppose that j∗ = d. The deviation payoff being less than vdj∗ −  can be re-written as
(1− δ)(B − vj∗j∗ ) +  ≤ δ(1− δL(δ))(vj
∗
j∗ − vj∗(aj∗))
As δ → 1, the LHS converges to . Because limδ→1 δL(δ) = κ, the RHS converges to (1−κ)(vj
∗
j∗−vj∗(aj∗)).
By definition of , the above inequality holds, and therefore, there is no profitable one-shot deviation if
δ is sufficiently high.
Stability in states of the form w(i, τ): We prove that no coalition has a profitable one-shot deviation.
We first consider the case where C = {i}. Since player i is being minmaxed, her best possible deviation
generates a payoff of vi for her. She finds this deviation to be unprofitable if
(1− δL(δ)−τ )vi(ai) + δL(δ)−τvii ≥ (1− δ)vi + δ(1− δL(δ))vi(ai) + δL(δ)+1vii. (6)
Because vii > vi ≥ vi(ai), it suffices to show that
(1− δL(δ))vi(ai) + δL(δ)vii ≥ (1− δ)vi + δ(1− δL(δ))vi(ai) + δL(δ)+1vii.
Re-arranging terms:
(1− δ)(1− δL(δ))vi(ai) + (1− δ)δL(δ)vii ≥ (1− δ)vi.
Dividing by (1− δ) yields:
(1− δL(δ))vi(ai) + δL(δ)vii ≥ vi.
Let us verify that this inequality holds for sufficiently high δ. Taking δ → 1 yields Inequality (4), which
is true. Hence Inequality (6) holds for sufficiently high δ.
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If C 6= {i}, then j∗ exists. Player j∗ finds this one-shot deviation to be unprofitable if
(1− δL(δ)−τ )vj∗(ai) + δL(δ)−τvij∗ ≥ (1− δ)B + δ(1− δL(δ))vj∗(aj∗) + δL(δ)+1vj
∗
j∗ . (7)
We prove that this inequality is satisfied if δ is sufficiently high. Examining the LHS, observe that for all
τ such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ L(δ),
lim
δ→1
[
(1− δL(δ)−τ )vj∗(ai) + δL(δ)−τvij∗
]
= lim
δ→1
[(
1− κ
δτ
)
vj∗(ai) +
κ
δτ
vij∗
]
= (1− κ˜)vj∗(ai) + κ˜vij∗
for some κ˜ ∈ [κ, 1]. Examining the RHS of (7), observe that
lim
δ→1
[
(1− δ)B + δ(1− δL(δ))vj∗(aj∗) + δL(δ)+1vj
∗
j∗
]
= lim
δ→1
[
(1− δL(δ))vj∗(aj∗) + δL(δ)vj
∗
j∗
]
= (1− κ)vj∗(aj∗) + κvj
∗
j∗ ≤ (1− κ)vj∗ + κvj
∗
j∗ ≤ (1− κ˜)vj∗ + κ˜vj
∗
j∗ ,
where the first equality follows from taking limits, the second from limδ→1 δL(δ) = κ, the first weak
inequality follows from vj∗(aj∗) ≤ vj∗ , the second weak inequality follows from κ˜ ≥ κ and vj∗ < vj
∗
j∗ .
Since κ˜ ∈ [κ, 1], (5) delivers that (1− κ˜)vj∗(ai) + κ˜vij∗ is strictly higher than (1− κ˜)vj∗ + κ˜vj
∗
j∗ . This term
guarantees that (7) holds for sufficiently high δ.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1 on p. 18
The “if” direction is true by definition. For the “only if” direction, consider a convention σ that respects
secret transfers for which coalition C has a profitable multi-shot deviation, σ′. In other words, there
exists a history h ∈ H such that Ui(h|σ′) > Ui(h|σ) for every i ∈ C. We show that the convention σ has
a profitable one-shot deviation, and therefore is not stable.
Since Ui(h|σ′) > Ui(h|σ) for every i ∈ C, it follows that
∑
i∈C Ui(h|σ′) >
∑
i∈C Ui(h|σ). Treat
coalition C as a hypothetical player whose payoff is the sum of the payoffs of members of coalition C.
Consider σ′ as a multi-shot deviation by player C that increases its payoff.
By Assumption 3, the convention σ has bounded continuation value. We establish, in Lemma 4
in the Supplementary Appendix that if coalition C has a profitable multi-shot deviation, that it also
has a profitable multi-shot deviation σ′ in which
{∑
i∈C Ui(h|σ′) : h ∈ H
}
is also bounded. Thus, the
hypothetical player C faces a decision tree with bounded values and given discounting, the standard
one-shot deviation principle applies. Therefore, there exists a history ĥ ∈ H such that
(1− δ)
∑
i∈C
ui
(
a(ĥ|σ′), T (ĥ|σ′)
)
+ δ
∑
i∈C
Ui
(
ĥ, a(ĥ|σ′), C, T (ĥ|σ′)
∣∣∣σ) >∑
i∈C
Ui(ĥ|σ)
Thus, as a hypothetical player, C has a profitable one-shot deviation. We construct transfers to divide
these gains so that each member of coalition C strictly profits from this one-shot deviation. Let T ∗ be
the transfers matrix such that for all (j, k) /∈ C ×C, T ∗jk = Tjk(ĥ|σ′); but for (j, k) ∈ C ×C, T ∗jk satisfies
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for every i ∈ C,
(1− δ)ui
(
a(ĥ|σ′), T ∗
)
+ δUi
(
ĥ, a(ĥ|σ′), C, T (ĥ|σ′)
∣∣∣σ) > Ui(ĥ|σ). (8)
Consider the two histories
h1 ≡
(
ĥ, a(ĥ|σ′), C, T (ĥ|σ′)
)
and h2 ≡
(
ĥ, a(ĥ|σ′), C, T ∗
)
.
By the construction of T ∗, h1 and h2 are identical up to the transfers within coalition C. Since the
convention σ respects secret transfers, it must be the case that for all i ∈ N ,
Ui
(
ĥ, a(ĥ|σ′), C, T (ĥ|σ′)
∣∣∣σ) = Ui(ĥ, a(ĥ|σ′), C, T ∗∣∣∣σ).
Inequality (8) can therefore be re-written as, for every i ∈ C,
(1− δ)ui
(
a(ĥ|σ′), T ∗
)
+ δUi
(
ĥ, a(ĥ|σ′), C, T ∗
∣∣∣σ) > Ui(ĥ|σ). (9)
According to Definition 4, inequality (9) implies that σ is not a stable convention.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3 on p. 20
We prove a stronger statement: every stable convention σ guarantees that for every coalition C and every
history h ∈ H, ∑
i∈C
Ui(h|σ) ≥ vC . (10)
Consider a convention σ such that there exists a coalition C and history ĥ such that
∑
i∈C Ui(ĥ|σ) < vC .
We prove that σ must not be stable.
The convention σ recommends an alternative a(h|σ) at every history h ∈ H. We construct a prof-
itable multi-shot deviation for coalition C. Consider an alternative d(h) ∈ BRC(a(h|σ)) in coalition
C’s best-response to the recommended alternative. By the definition of vC and BRC(.), it follows that∑
i∈C vi(d(h)) ≥ vC >
∑
i∈C Ui(ĥ|σ). Since coalition C’s total generated payoff from d(h),
∑
i∈C vi(d(h)),
is higher than
∑
i∈C Ui(ĥ|σ), we can find transfers among players in C such that the payoff of each
individual player i ∈ C is higher than Ui(ĥ|σ). Formally, at every history h, there exist transfers
T˜C(h) ≡ [T˜ij(h)]i∈C,j∈N such that T˜ij(h) = 0 for all j ∈ N\C, and
vi(d(h)) +
∑
j∈C
T˜ji(h)−
∑
j∈C
T˜ij(h) > Ui(ĥ|σ)
for all i ∈ C. As a result, for each player i ∈ C, the experienced payoff from the stage-game outcome
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(
d(h), C, [T˜C(h), T−C(h|σ)]
)
satisfies
ui
(
d(h), [T˜C(h), T−C(h|σ)]
)
= vi(d(h)) +
∑
j∈C
T˜ji(h) +
∑
j∈N\C
Tji(h|σ)−
∑
j∈N
T˜ij(h)
≥ vi(d(h)) +
∑
j∈C
T˜ji(h)−
∑
j∈C
T˜ij(h)
>Ui(ĥ|σ)
where the weak inequality follows because Tij(h|σ) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N , and T˜ij(h) = 0 for all j ∈ N\C.
Observe that the LHS concerns every history, including ĥ and those that follow. These steps prove that
the multi-shot deviation σ′ by coalition C, defined by σ′(h) ≡
(
d(h), C, [T˜C(h), T−C(h|σ)]
)
for every
history h ∈ H, is profitable: Ui(ĥ|σ′) > Ui(ĥ|σ) for every i ∈ C. Lemma 1 then implies that σ is not
stable.
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B Supplementary Appendix
B.1 Preliminary Results
Below, we list two preliminary results used in our proofs.
Lemma 3. Suppose σ is a stable convention. Then for any player i and any history h ∈ H, the recom-
mended transfers T = T (h|σ) from the convention must satisfy
∑
j 6=i
T ji ≤ 1 + δ
1− δ diam({U(h|σ) : h ∈ H}) + diam(V
†
IR)
Proof. At any history, the recommended alternative a = a(h|σ) and the recommended transfers T =
T (h|σ) from the convention must satisfy
(1− δ)[vi(a) +
∑
j 6=i
T ji] + δ inf{Ui(h|σ) : h ∈ H} ≤ sup{Ui(h|σ) : h ∈ H}.
Otherwise, player i would have a profitable one-shot individual deviation from accepting all incoming
transfers and reneging on all outgoing transfers. Rearranging terms, we have
∑
j 6=i
T ji ≤ sup{Ui(h|σ) : h ∈ H} − [(1− δ)vi(a) + δ inf{Ui(h|σ) : h ∈ H}
(1− δ)
=
sup{Ui(h|σ) : h ∈ H}
1− δ −
δ inf{Ui(h|σ) : h ∈ H}
1− δ − vi(a)
By the triangle inequality,
∑
j 6=i
T ji ≤
∣∣∣∣sup{Ui(h|σ) : h ∈ H}1− δ
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣δ inf{Ui(h|σ) : h ∈ H}1− δ
∣∣∣∣+ |vi(a)| .
Since |sup{Ui(h|σ) : h ∈ H}| ≤ diam({U(h|σ) : h ∈ H}), |inf{Ui(h|σ) : h ∈ H}| ≤ diam({U(h|σ) : h ∈
H}), and |vi(a)| ≤ diam(V†IR), we have∑
j 6=i
T ji ≤ 1 + δ
1− δ diam({U(h|σ) : h ∈ H}) + diam(V
†
IR)
Lemma 4. Suppose σ′ is a profitable multi-shot coalitional deviation from a stable convention σ, then
there exists a profitable multi-shot coalitional deviation σ′′ from σ, such that the set {∑i∈C Ui(h|σ′′) : h ∈
H} is bounded.
Proof. We break this argument into two steps.
Step 1: We show that the set {∑i∈C Ui(h|σ′) : h ∈ H} is bounded from above. It suffices to show that
{∑i∈C ui(σ′(h)) : h ∈ H} is bounded from above.
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First we show that for player i /∈ C, his stage-game values is bounded from below regardless of h.
Since j is making the same outgoing transfers in σ′(h) as in σ(h), we have
ui(σ
′(h))− ui(σ(h)) =
[
vi(a(h|σ′)) +
∑
k 6=i
Tki(h|σ′)
]
−
[
vi(a(h|σ)) +
∑
k 6=i
Tki(h|σ)
]
Rearranging terms, we have
ui(σ
′(h)) = ui(σ(h)) +
[
vi(a(h|σ′))− vi(a(h|σ))
]
−
∑
k 6=i
Tki(h|σ) +
∑
k 6=i
Tki(h|σ′)
≥ ui(σ(h)) +
[
vi(a(h|σ′))− vi(a(h|σ))
]
−
∑
k 6=i
Tki(h|σ). (11)
By definition,
Ui(h|σ) = (1− δ)ui(σ(h)) + δUi(h, σ(h)|σ),
or
ui(σ(h)) =
δUi(h, σ(h)|σ)− Ui(h|σ)
1− δ .
Plugging the above equation into inequality (11), we have
ui(σ
′(h)) ≥ δUi(h, σ(h)|σ)− Ui(h|σ)
1− δ +
[
vi(a(h|σ′))− vi(a(h|σ))
]
−
∑
k 6=i
Tki(h|σ).
In the inequality above, [δUi(h, σ(h)|σ)− Ui(h|σ)]/(1− δ) is bounded since σ has bounded continuation
values;
[
vi(a(h|σ′)) − vi(a(h|σ))
]
is bounded because there are finite number of alternatives; and lastly,∑
k 6=i Tki(h|σ) is bounded from above by Lemma 3. As a result, we can find number K such that
ui(σ
′(h)) ≥ K for every history h and every player i /∈ C.
After every history h ∈ H, since the total experienced utility must equal the total generated utility,
and because a is a maximizer of
∑
i∈N vi(s),∑
i∈C
ui(σ
′(h)) +
∑
i/∈C
ui(σ
′(h)) ≤
∑
i∈N
vi(a),
or ∑
i∈C
ui(σ
′(h)) ≤
∑
i∈N
vi(a)−
∑
i/∈C
ui(σ
′(h)).
After plugging in the bounds derived above, we have∑
i∈C
ui(σ
′(h)) ≤
∑
i∈N
vi(a)− (n− |C|)×K ∀h ∈ H,
so the set {∑i∈C ui(σ′(h)) : h ∈ H} is bounded from above.
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Step 2: We show that {∑i∈C Ui(h|σ′) : h ∈ H} is bounded from below. Suppose otherwise. We can
construct another profitable deviation σ′′ such that {∑i∈C Ui(h|σ′′) : h ∈ H} is bounded: if∑i∈C Ui(ĥ|σ′)
falls below arg mina∈A
∑
i∈C vi(a), at all histories following ĥ we ask C to block and refuse all outgoing
transfers, while leaving the recommended alternative unchanged.
Formally, for a history ĥ ∈ H, let F (ĥ) ≡ {hĥ : h ∈ H} denote the set of histories that can follow from
ĥ. Let HC(σ
′) ≡ {h ∈ H : ∑i∈C Ui(h|σ′) < mina∈A∑i∈C vi(a)}. Let 0C denote the vector of zero-valued
transfers made from players in C. Define
σ′′(h) =

(
a(h|σ), C, [0C , T−C(h|σ)]
)
∀h ∈ F (ĥ) for some ĥ ∈ HC(σ′)
σ′(h) otherwise
The deviation σ′′ is still profitable.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2 on p. 16
Part 1: For every δ ≥ 0, every stable convention gives each player i a payoff of at least vi.
The proof mirrors that of the same part in Theorem 1, and so we elaborate on the necessary changes
to the argument below. Consider any convention σ and player i such that Ui(∅|σ) < vi. We first show
that player i has a profitable multi-shot deviation from this convention.
We consider the following multi-shot deviation: in every period, player i blocks and best-responds to
the convention, and refuses to make any outgoing transfers. Formally, this is a plan
σ′(h) =
(
(a(h|σ′)), {i}, [0i, T−i(h|σ)]
)
∀h ∈ H
where a(h|σ′) ∈ BRi
(
a(h|σ)) for every h ∈ H. By the definition of vi, this multi-shot deviation gives i
at least vi after every history, so Ui(∅|σ′) > Ui(∅|σ).
By Assumption 3, the convention σ has bounded continuation value. Moreover, Assumption 3 implies
that all incoming transfers player i receives on the path of the deviation σ′ are also bounded (as proven
in Lemma 3). As a result, player i faces a decision tree with bounded values in the deviation plan σ′ and
we can apply the standard one-shot deviation principle to prove that there exists a profitable one-shot
deviation for {i}. Therefore, σ is not stable.
Part 2: For every u ∈ U†IR, there is a δ < 1 such that for every δ ∈ (δ, 1), there exists a stable convention
with a discounted payoff equal to u.
We first argue that there exists a finite set of payoff vectors whose convex hull contains the set U†IR.
Lemma 5. Let a ∈ arg maxa∈A
∑
i∈N vi(a) and a ∈ arg mina∈A
∑
i∈N vi(a) two alternatives that maxi-
mize and minimize players’ total generated payoffs, respectively. There exist payoff vectors {u˜1, . . . , u˜M} ⊆
U(a) ∪ U(a), such that U†IR ⊆ co(u˜1, . . . , u˜M ).
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Proof. By definition,
U†IR ⊆ U
†
IR ≡
{
u ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈N
vi(a) ≤
∑
i∈N
ui ≤
∑
i∈N
vi(a) and ui ≥ vi∀i ∈ N
}
.
Since U†IR is a bounded polyhedron, it is also a polytope. Let x1, . . . , xK be its vertices. Any point inside
U†IR can then be expressed as convex combinations of the points x1, . . . , xK . Since xk ∈ co(U(a)∪U(a)) for
all 1 ≤ k ≤ K, for each k, there exist {u˜k,1, . . . , u˜k,mk} ⊆ U(a) ∪ U(a) such that xk ⊆ co(u˜k,1, . . . , u˜k,mk).
As a result U†IR ⊆ co(∪1≤k≤K
{
u˜k,1, . . . , u˜k,mk
}
).
Lemma 5 implies that there exist payoff vectors {u˜1, . . . , u˜M} ⊆ U(a) ∪ U(a) such that U†IR ⊆
co(u˜1, . . . , u˜M ), where u˜m = u(a˜m, T˜m) for some alternative a˜m ∈ {a, a} and transfers matrix T˜m for
each m = 1, . . . ,M . Lemma 2 then guarantees that for any  > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
for all δ ∈ (δ, 1), there exist sequences {{ai,τ , T i,τ}∞τ=0 : i = 0, 1, . . . , n} such that for each i and t,
(1− δ)∑∞τ=0 δτu(ai,τ , T i,τ ) = ui and ∣∣∣∣ui − (1− δ)∑∞τ=t δτu(ai,τ , T i,τ )∣∣∣∣ < . We fix an  < (1− κ) min{
mini,j 6=i(u
j
i − uii),mini uii − vi}, and given that , consider δ exceeding the appropriate δ.
Now fix any u0 ∈ U†IR. We argue below, using transfers, that we can find player-specific punishments for
u0: consider the vectors {ui : i ∈ N} defined by
uij =
uj −  if j = i,uj + n−1 if j 6= i.
Observe that {ui}ni=1 ⊆ U†IR when  is sufficiently small, and that for all i, uii < ui and for all j 6= i,
uji > u
i
i. Therefore, this is a vector of player-specific punishments.
Given these player-specific punishments, let κ ∈ (0, 1) be such that for every κ˜ ∈ [κ, 1], the following
is true for every i:
(1− κ˜)vi(ai) + κ˜uii > vi (12)
For every j 6= i: (1− κ˜)vj(ai) + κ˜uij > (1− κ˜)vj + κ˜ujj (13)
By an argument identical to that which we saw in Theorem 1, there exists a value of κ ∈ (0, 1) such
that the inequality holds for all κ˜ ∈ [κ, 1], i ∈ N and j ∈ N\{i}. Let L(δ) ≡
⌈
log κ
log δ
⌉
where d·e is the
ceiling function. As before, we use the property that limδ→1 δL(δ) = κ.
We describe the convention that we use to sustain u0. Let 0 denote the transfer matrix where all
players make no transfers. Consider the convention represented by the automaton (W,w(0, 0), f, γ), where
• W ≡ {w(d, τ)|0 ≤ d ≤ n, τ ≥ 0} ∪ {w(i, τ)|1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ τ < L(δ)} is the set of possible states;
• w(0, 0) is the initial state;
• f : W → OTU is the output function, where f(w(d, τ)) = (ad,τ , ∅, T d,τ ) and f(w(i, τ)) = (ai, ∅,0);
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• γ : W ×OTU →W is the transition function. For states of the form w(d, τ), the transition is
γ
(
w(d, τ), (a,C, T )
)
=
w(j∗, 0) if C 6= ∅, j∗ = arg minj∈C{uj(a, T )− u
d,t
j }
w(d, τ + 1) otherwise
For states in {w(i, τ)|0 ≤ τ < L(δ)− 1},
γ
(
w(i, τ), (a,C, T )
)
=

w(j∗, 0) if {C 6= ∅} ∩ ({ui(a, T ) > vi} ∪ {i /∈ C})
j∗ = arg minC\{i}{uj(a, T )− vj(ai)}
w(i, τ + 1) otherwise
For states of the form w(i, L(δ)− 1), the transition is
γ
(
w(i, L(δ)− 1), (a,C, T )) =

w(j∗, 0) if {C 6= ∅} ∩ ({ui(a, T ) > vi} ∪ {i /∈ C})
j∗ = arg minC\{i}{uj(a, T )− vj(ai)}
w(i, 0) otherwise
The convention represented by the above automaton yields payoff profile u0. By construction, the
continuation values in different states, V (·), satisfy:∣∣∣∣∣∣ud − V (w(d, τ))∣∣∣∣∣∣ < , τ = 0, 1, . . .
V (w(i, τ)) = (1− δL(δ)−τ )v(ai) + δL(δ)−τV (w(i, 0)), 0 ≤ τ ≤ L(δ)
In the NTU environment, since the feasible payoff set V† is bounded, whenever a coalition deviates,
we can find number B > 0 that bounds every player’s stage-game payoff. With transfers, however,
players’ stage-game payoffs are no longer bounded: in particular, we do not impose a priori bounds
on the transfers made among members of the blocking coalition. This makes it more difficult to deter
coalitional deviations, since players can use transfers to compensate each other.
Regardless, the total stage-game payoff of the deviating coalition is still bounded, so at least one
member still has a bounded payoff. The definition of j∗ in the automaton above ensures that the
“scapegoat” selected by the convention can be effectively deterred as δ → 1. It remains to show that this
convention is stable. This is the next step.
Stability in states of the form w(d, τ): If a coalition C 6= ∅ blocks in automaton state w(d, τ) and
the outcome (â, C, T̂ ) is realized, the convention punishes j∗ = arg minj∈C{uj(â, T̂ ) − ud,τj }. It follows
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uj∗(â, T̂ )− ud,τj∗ ≤
1
|C|
[∑
j∈C
uj(â, T̂ )−
∑
j∈C
ud,τj
]
≤ 1|C|
max
a∈A
∑
j∈C
vj(a)−min
a∈A
∑
j∈C
vj(a) +
∑
j∈C
∑
k/∈C
T d,τjk

≤ 1|C|
max
a∈A
∑
j∈C
vj(a)−min
a∈A
∑
j∈C
vj(a) + max
1≤m≤M
∑
j∈C
∑
k/∈C
T˜mjk
 ,
where the first inequality follows from the minimum among a set of numbers being less than their average;
the second inequality follows from the difference between
∑
j∈C uj(â, T̂ ) and
∑
j∈C u
d,τ
j resulting from
either differences in the generated payoffs from the realized alternative, or the outgoing transfers to players
in N\C; lastly, the third inequality follows because all T d,τ are drawn from {T˜m}Mm=1. Rearranging terms:
uj∗(â, T̂ ) ≤ max
j∈N,1≤m≤M
u˜mj + max
C⊆N,C 6=∅
1
|C|
max
a∈A
∑
j∈C
vj(a)−min
a∈A
∑
j∈C
vj(a) + max
1≤m≤M
∑
j∈C
∑
k/∈C
T˜mjk
 .
In the inequality above, each term in the RHS is independent of δ and (d, τ). Thus, we can find a uniform
bound B1 such that uj∗(â, T̂ ) < B1 for every δ and (d, τ).
Given this bound, we can use the analogue of the argument used in Theorem 1. For all τ , j∗ obtains
a payoff greater than udj∗ − . By deviating, j∗ obtains a payoff less than
(1− δ)B1 + δVj∗(w(j∗, 0)) = (1− δ)B1 + δ
[
(1− δL(δ))vj(aj) + δL(δ)uj
∗
j∗
]
By the exact same argument as in Theorem 1, this one-shot deviation is unprofitable for j∗ and hence,
for coalition C if δ is sufficiently high.
Stability in states of the form w(i, τ): Suppose coalition C 6= ∅ blocks, leading to the outcome
(â, C, T̂ ), We prove that at least one player in C does not find this one-shot deviation to be profitable.
There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: i ∈ C and ui(â, T̂ ) ≤ vi. In this case, the convention selects player i to be the scapegoat. She
finds this deviation to be unprofitable if
(1− δL(δ)−τ )vi(ai) + δL(δ)−τuii ≥ (1− δ)vi + δ(1− δL(δ))vi(ai) + δL(δ)+1uii. (14)
which follows from Inequality (12) for sufficiently high δ (using steps identical to the analogous argument
in Theorem 1).
Case 2: Either i /∈ C or ui(â, T̂ ) > vi. In this case it cannot be that C = {i} because otherwise
ui(â, T̂ ) ≤ vi. The convention then punishes j∗ = arg minj∈C\{i}{uj(â, T̂ ) − vj(ai)}. Denote C\{i} by
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C ′. It follows that
uj∗(â, T̂ )− vj∗(ai) ≤
1
|C ′|
[ ∑
j∈C′
uj(â, T̂ )−
∑
j∈C′
vj(ai)
]
=
1
|C ′|
[ ∑
j∈C′∪{i}
uj(â, T̂ )−
∑
j∈C′∪{i}
vj(ai) + vi(ai)− ui(â, T̂ )
]
=
1
|C ′|
[ ∑
j∈C′∪{i}
uj(â, T̂ )−
∑
j∈C′∪{i}
vj(ai)
]
+
1
|C ′|
[
vi(ai)− ui(â, T̂ )
]
. (15)
Furthermore, ∑
j∈C′∪{i}
uj(â, T̂ )−
∑
j∈C′∪{i}
vj(ai) ≤ max
a∈A
∑
j∈C′∪{i}
vj(a)−min
a∈A
∑
j∈C′∪{i}
vj(a). (16)
The inequality above follows since in the outcome (â, C, T̂ ), all players outside of C ′ ∪ {i} are following
the recommendation from automaton state w(i, τ) and making zero transfers.
Finally, if i /∈ C then ui(â, T̂ ) ≥ mina∈A vi(a), since player i is following the recommendation from
automaton state w(i, τ) and makes zero outgoing transfers in the outcome (â, C, T̂ ); otherwise if i ∈ C
then ui(â, T̂ ) > vi. In either case,
vi(ai)− ui(â, T̂ ) ≤ vi(ai)−min{vi,min
a∈A
vi(a)} (17)
Plugging inequalities (16) and (17) into inequality (15), we have
uj∗(â, T̂ )− vj∗(ai) ≤
1
|C ′|
max
a∈A
∑
j∈C′∪{i}
vj(a)−min
a∈A
∑
j∈C′∪{i}
vj(a)− vi(ai) + min{vi,min
a∈A
vi(a)}

≡ b2(i, C ′)
As a result, across all states w(i, τ) and all possible blocking coalitions C 6= ∅, we have
uj∗(â, T̂ ) ≤ max
i∈N,C′⊆N\{i},C′ 6=∅
b2(i, C
′)
In the inequality above, all the terms in the RHS are independent of δ. Therefore, we can find a uniform
bound B2 such that uj∗(â, T̂ ) < B2 for every δ. We use these steps to show that player j
∗ finds this
one-shot deviation to be unprofitable. Player j∗ does not benefit from this deviation if
(1− δL(δ)−τ )vj∗(ai) + δL(δ)−τuij∗ ≥ (1− δ)B2 + δ(1− δL(δ))vj∗(aj∗) + δL(δ)+1uj
∗
j∗ . (18)
This inequality is satisfied for sufficiently high δ, and the argument follows the same steps as that of the
analogous part of Theorem 1.
41
B.3 Proof of Theorem 4 on p. 21
Part 1: Under secret transfers, for every δ ≥ 0, every stable convention implements payoffs only within
the efficient β-core.
We first argue that for every stable convention σ, an efficient alternative must be chosen at every history:
a(h|σ) ∈ A at every h ∈ H. Suppose otherwise that â ≡ a(ĥ|σ) /∈ A for some history ĥ, so that∑
i∈N vi(â) < maxa∈A
∑
i∈N vi(a). It follows that∑
i∈N
Ui(ĥ|σ) = (1− δ)
∑
i∈N
vi(â) + δ
∑
i∈N
Ui(ĥ, â, ∅, T̂ |σ)
< (1− δ) max
a∈A
∑
i∈N
vi(a) + δ
∑
i∈N
Ui(ĥ, â, ∅, T̂ |σ)
≤ (1− δ) max
a∈A
∑
i∈N
vi(a) + δmax
a∈A
∑
i∈N
vi(a)
= max
a∈A
∑
i∈N
vi(a)
= vN
where the strict inequality follows from the definition of â, the weak inequality follows from the total
experienced payoff being the total generated payoff in every period, and the final equality follows from
Assumption 2. This strict inequality contradicts Inequality (10) established in the proof of Theorem 3.
Having argued that a stable convention must choose actions in A at every history, the remainder of
the proof is identical, but replacing A with A.
Part 2: If the strict efficient β-core is non-empty, then for every payoff profile u ∈ Bs, there is a δ < 1
such that for every δ ∈ (δ, 1), there exists a stable convention with a discounted payoff equal to u.
Fix any payoff vector uN ∈ Bs. Below we construct “coalition-specific” punishments for all coalitions but
the grand coalition.
Lemma 6. There exist coalition-specific punishments {uC : C ∈ C\{N}} in Bs such that∑
i∈C
uCi <
∑
i∈C
uNi (19)
and for any coalition C ′ 6= C ∑
i∈C
uCi <
∑
i∈C
uC
′
i (20)
Proof. For any coalition C ∈ C\{N}, consider the vector uC defined by
uCi =
uNi − |C| i ∈ CuNi + |N\C| i /∈ C
Compared to the payoff vector uN , in uC every player in C is charged equally, with a total fee summing
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up to ; by contrast, players outside of C are paid equally, with a total of amount also summing up to .
This fee  may be set sufficiently small to ensure all uC ’s are in Bs.
We show that these vectors satisfy inequalities (19) and (20). By construction,
∑
i∈C u
C
i =
∑
i∈C u
N
i −
 <
∑
i∈C u
N
i , so Inequality (19) is satisfied. To verify (20), consider two coalitions C,C
′ ∈ C\{N} with
C 6= C ′. Coalition C can be partitioned as the union of two components C = (C\C ′) ∪ (C ∩ C ′). So∑
i∈C
uC
′
i =
∑
i∈C\C′
uC
′
i +
∑
i∈C∩C′
uC
′
i
=
 ∑
i∈C\C′
uNi +
|C\C ′|
|N\C ′|
+ [ ∑
i∈C∩C′
uNi −
|C ∩ C ′|
|C ′| 
]
(21)
=
∑
i∈C
uNi −
[ |C ∩ C ′|
|C ′| −
|C\C ′|
|N\C ′|
]

>
∑
i∈C
uNi −  (22)
=
∑
i∈C
uCi
Equality (21) follows since compared to uN , uC
′
gives every player outside of C ′ an extra payoff of |N\C| ,
while lowering the payoff of every player inside C ′ by |C′| . Since C 6= C ′, either C\C ′ 6= ∅ or C ∩C ′ 6= C ′
must be true; in other words, either |C\C
′|
|N\C′| > 0 or
|C∩C′|
|C′| < 1. In either cases, inequality (22) follows,
which verifies (20).
Using Lemma 6, let {uC : C ∈ C\{N}} be the vector of coalition-specific punishments for uN . Fix
an alternative a ∈ A. Since {uC : C ∈ C} ⊆ U(a), we can find transfer matrices {TC : C ∈ C} such that
u(a, TC) = uC for all C ∈ C.
Let aeC ∈ arg mina∈A maxa′∈EC
∑
i∈C vi(a
′) be an efficient alternative that can be used to minmax
player i. Note that by construction,
∑
i∈C vi(a
e
C) ≤ veC . Given the coalition-specific punishments, let
κ ∈ (0, 1) be such that for every κ˜ ∈ [κ, 1], the following is true for every coalition C:
(1− κ˜)
∑
i∈C
vi(a
e
C) + κ˜
∑
i∈C
uiC > v
e
C (23)
For every C ′ 6= C: (1− κ˜)
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C) + κ˜
∑
i∈C′
uCi > (1− κ˜)veC′ + κ˜
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i . (24)
Inequality (23) implies that in terms of total value, coalition C is willing to bear the cost of
∑
i∈C vi(a
e
i )
with the promise of transitioning into its coalition-specific punishment rather than staying at its minmax.
By an argument identical to that we saw in Theorem 1, there exists a value of κ ∈ (0, 1) such that the
inequality holds for all κ˜ ∈ [κ, 1], i ∈ N and j ∈ N\{i}. Let L(δ) ≡
⌈
log κ
log δ
⌉
where d·e is the ceiling
function. As before, we use the property that limδ→1 δL(δ) = κ.
We describe the convention that we use to sustain uN . Let 0 denote the transfer matrix where all
player make zero transfers. Consider the convention represented by the automaton (W,w(N), f, γ), where
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• W ≡ {w(C) : C ∈ C} ∪ {w(C, τ)|C ∈ C\{N}, 0 ≤ τ < L(δ)} is the set of possible states;
• w(N) is the initial state;
• f : W → OTU is the output function: for every C ∈ C, f(w(C)) = (a, ∅, TC); for every C ∈ C\{N},
f(w(C, τ)) = (aeC , ∅,0);
• γ : W ×OTU →W is the transition function. For states of the form w(C), the transition is
γ
(
w(C), (a,C ′, T )
)
=
w(C ′, 0) if C ′ /∈ {N}w(C) otherwise
For states in {w(C, τ)|0 ≤ τ < L(δ)− 1}, the transition is
γ(w(C, τ), (a,C ′, T )) =
w(C ′, 0) if C ′ /∈ {C,N}w(C, τ + 1) otherwise
For states of the form w(C,L(δ)− 1), the transition is
γ(w(C,L(δ)− 1), (a,C ′, T )) =
w(C ′, 0) if C ′ /∈ {C,N}w(C), otherwise
The convention represented by the above automaton yields payoff profile u0. By construction, the
continuation values in different states, V (·), satisfy:
V (w(C)) = uC , C ∈ C
V (w(C, τ)) = (1− δL(δ)−τ )v(aeC) + δL(δ)−τV (w(C)), 0 ≤ τ ≤ L(δ)
Next, we check that this automaton representation has no profitable one-shot coalitional deviation for
any C ∈ C. To this end, it suffices to check that for each C ∈ C, no deviation can result in higher total
value for C: if this is true, then it is impossible to make every player i ∈ C better off.
Since deviations by the grand coalition do not change continuation play, and the recommended alter-
natives are always efficient in all possible automaton states, the grand coalition N does not have profitable
deviations. It remains to check that none of the other coalitions have profitable one-shot deviations. This
is the next step.
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Stability in states of the form w(C): Suppose coalition C ′ blocks and the outcome (a′, C ′, T ′) is
realized. The total payoff of C ′ from this outcome satisfies∑
i∈C′
ui(a
′, T ′) =
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
′) +
∑
i∈C′
∑
j∈N\C′
T ′ji −
∑
i∈C′
∑
j∈N\C′
T ′ij
≤
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
′) +
∑
i∈C′
∑
j∈N\C′
T ′ji
≤ max
a∈A
∑
i∈C′
vi(a) + max
C∈C
∑
i∈C′
∑
j∈N\C′
TCji ≡ b1(C ′).
The final inequality follows from players outside of the blocking coalition C ′ making the same transfers as
recommended by the convention, and TC being the transfers that are recommended in automaton state
w(C). As a result, we can find number B1 ≡ maxC′∈C\{N} b1(C ′) that the total stage-game payoff for any
deviation coalition from any automaton state is less than B1. Crucially, B1 does not depend on δ.
Consider a one-shot deviation to (a,C ′, T ) by coalition C ′ ∈ C\{N}. Coalition C has total payoff∑
i∈C′ u
C
i without deviating. By deviating, C
′ obtains a total payoff less than
(1− δ)B1 + δ
∑
i∈C′
Vi(w(C
′, 0)) = (1− δ)B1 + δ
[
(1− δL(δ))
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C′) + δ
L(δ)
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i
]
For the deviation to be profitable, the total value for C ′ must be higher. So the one-shot deviation is
unprofitable if the above term is no more than
∑
i∈C′ u
C
i . We prove that this is the case both for C
′ 6= C
and C ′ = C.
First consider C ′ 6= C. Observe that
lim
δ→1
(1− δ)B1 + δ
[
(1− δL(δ))
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C′) + δ
L(δ)
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i
]
= (1− κ)
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C′) + κ
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i <
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i <
∑
i∈C′
uCi .
It follows that the one-shot coalition deviation is not profitable.
Now suppose that C ′ = C. The deviation payoff being less than
∑
i∈C′ u
C′
i can be re-written as
(1− δ)(B1 −
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
) ≤ δ(1− δL(δ))(
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i −
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C′))
As δ → 1, the LHS converges to 0. Because limδ→1 δL(δ) = κ, the RHS converges to (1− κ)(
∑
i∈C′ u
C′
i −∑
i∈C′ vi(a
e
C′)). So the above inequality holds, and therefore, there is no profitable one-shot deviation if
δ is sufficiently high.
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Stability in states of the form w(C, τ): Suppose coalition C ′ blocks and the outcome (a′, C ′, T ′)
is realized. Coalition C ′’s total payoff from this outcome satisfies∑
i∈C′
ui(a
′, T ′) =
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
′) +
∑
i∈C′
∑
j∈N\C′
T ′ji −
∑
i∈C′
∑
j∈N\C′
T ′ij
≤
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
′) +
∑
i∈C′
∑
j∈N\C′
T ′ji
≤ max
a∈A
∑
i∈C′
vi(a) ≡ b2(C ′).
The inequality above follows because, in states w(C, τ), the convention recommends players to make zero
transfers, so there are no incoming transfers from players outside of the blocking coalition C ′. As a result,
we can find number B2 ≡ maxC′∈C b2(C ′) that the total stage-game payoff for any deviating coalition
from any automaton state is less than B2. Note that B2 does not depend on δ. We now prove that no
coalition has a profitable one-shot deviation.
Case 1: C ′ = C. by the definition of aeC , when coalition C blocks the outcome (a
e
C , ∅,0), its stage-game
payoff cannot exceed veC . As a result, coalition C has no profitable deviation if
(1− δL(δ)−τ )
∑
i∈C
vi(a
e
C) + δ
L(δ)−τ∑
i∈C
uCi ≥ (1− δ)veC + δ(1− δL(δ))
∑
i∈C
vi(a
e
C) + δ
L(δ)+1
∑
i∈C
uCi . (25)
Because
∑
i∈C u
i
C > v
e
C ≥
∑
i∈C vi(a
e
C), it suffices to show that
(1− δL(δ))
∑
i∈C
vi(a
e
C) + δ
L(δ)
∑
i∈C
uCi ≥ (1− δ)veC + δ(1− δL(δ))
∑
i∈C
vi(a
e
C) + δ
L(δ)+1
∑
i∈C
uCi .
Re-arranging terms:
(1− δ)(1− δL(δ))
∑
i∈C
vi(a
e
C) + (1− δ)δL(δ)
∑
i∈C
uCi ≥ (1− δ)veC .
Dividing by (1− δ) yields:
(1− δL(δ))
∑
i∈C
vi(a
e
C) + δ
L(δ)
∑
i∈C
uCi ≥ veC .
Now taking the limit of the LHS as δ → 1 yields Inequality (23), and hence Inequality (25) is true for
sufficiently high δ.
Case 2: C ′ 6= C. Coalition C ′ finds no profitable one-shot deviation to be unprofitable if
(1− δL(δ)−τ )
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C) + δ
L(δ)−τ ∑
i∈C′
uCi ≥ (1− δ)B2 + δ(1− δL(δ))
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C′) + δ
L(δ)+1
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i . (26)
We prove that this inequality is satisfied if δ is sufficiently high. Examining the LHS, observe that for all
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τ such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ L(δ),
lim
δ→1
[
(1− δL(δ)−τ )
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C) + δ
L(δ)−τ ∑
i∈C′
uCi
]
= lim
δ→1
[(
1− κ
δτ
)∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C) +
κ
δτ
∑
i∈C′
uCi
]
= (1− κ˜)
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C) + κ˜
∑
i∈C′
uCi
for some κ˜ ∈ [κ, 1].27
Examining the RHS of (26), observe that
lim
δ→1
[
(1− δ)B2 + δ(1− δL(δ))
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C′) + δ
L(δ)+1
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i
]
= lim
δ→1
[
(1− δL(δ))
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C′) + δ
L(δ)
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i
]
= (1− κ)
∑
i∈C′
vi(a
e
C′) + κ
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i
≤(1− κ)veC′ + κ
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i ≤ (1− κ˜)veC′ + κ˜
∑
i∈C′
uC
′
i ,
where the first equality follows from taking limits, the second from limδ→1 δL(δ) = κ, the first weak
inequality follows from
∑
i∈C′ vi(a
e
C′) ≤ veC′ <
∑
i∈C′ u
C
i , and the second weak inequality follows from
κ˜ ≥ κ and veC′ <
∑
i∈C′ u
C′
i . Since κ˜ ∈ [κ, 1], (24) delivers that (1 − κ˜)
∑
i∈C′ vi(a
e
C) + κ˜
∑
i∈C′ u
C
i is
strictly higher than (1− κ˜)veC′ + κ˜
∑
i∈C′ u
C′
i . This term guarantees that (26) holds for sufficiently high
δ.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 5 on p. 23
The argument comprises several steps. Throughout this argument, we restrict attention to stationary
conventions, i.e., those in which the recommendation is identical across all on-path histories.
First, we construct punishments for each player. Lemmas 7 and 8 establish the existence of stable
conventions σi that guarantee Ui(∅|σi) = 0 for each player i. The case where there is a single veto player
(|D| = 1), analyzed in Lemma 7, requires the discount factor to be sufficiently high. The case where
there are two or more veto players (|D| ≥ 2), analyzed in Lemma 8, applies for every discount factor.
Our second step compares the set of outcomes enforced using the above stable conventions as punish-
ments with those enforced by punishments where every member of a deviating coalition simultaneously
obtains 0. Lemma 9 proves that these two sets are identical.
The third step (Lemma 10) shows, given the earlier two steps, that a stationary convention is stable
if and only if every winning coalition obtains at least (1− δ).
The proof for the secret transfers component of our result follows immediately from Theorem 3. The
proof for the single veto-player case, in both the NTU and perfectly monitored transfers settings, follows
from combining Lemmas 7, 9 and 10. The proof for the multiple veto-player case, in both the NTU and
perfectly monitored transfers settings, follows from combining Lemmas 8 to 10.
27In the second equality, we use κ˜ rather than κ because τ is any integer between 0 and L(δ).
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Lemma 7. Suppose |D| = 1. When monitoring is perfect either with or without transfers, for every
player i ∈ N , there is a stable convention σi such that Ui(∅|σi) = 0 when δ > n−2n−1 .
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose the collegium D consists of player 1. Let â ≡ (1, 0, . . . , 0)
denote the unique alternative in the core, and a ≡ (0, 1n−1 , . . . , 1n−1) denote the alternative that equally
divides the total payoff among all non-veto players.
Case 1: Non-Transferable Utility. Let σ1 be the core-reversion convention that recommends (a, ∅) on
path, and recommends (â, ∅) indefinitely after any history where blocking has occurred. σ1 gives player
1 zero payoff. We will verify that σ1 is stable.
No coalition has profitable deviations once continuation play reverts back to the core. To check
stability on path of play, consider a blocking coalition C. Since the game is non-dictatorial, if C is a
winning coalition, it must be the case that {1} ⊆ C but C 6= {1}. Let j 6= 1 be a player in C and consider
any deviation (a′, C) by C. Since a′j ≤ 1, we have
(1− δ)a′j + δ0 ≤ 1− δ ≤
1
n− 1
so player j prefers following the convention over deviating and reverting to the core. As a result, no
coalition C has profitable one-shot deviation after any history, so σ1 is stable.
For i 6= 1, let σi be the convention that recommends (â, ∅) after every history. The convention is
stable, and gives each player i 6= 1 zero payoff.
Case 2: Perfectly Monitored Transfers. Let σ1 be the core-reversion convention such that σ1 recommends
(a, ∅,0) on path; suppose blocking (a′, C, T ′) has occurred, σ1 recommends (â, ∅,0) indefinitely afterwards
if u1(a
′, T ′) ≥ 0, but ignores the blocking if instead u1(a′, T ′) < 0. σ1 gives player 1 zero payoff. We will
verify that σ1 is stable.
No coalition has profitable deviations once continuation play reverts back to the core. To check
stability on path of play, consider a blocking coalition C. Since the game is non-dictatorial, if C is a
winning coalition it must be the case that {1} ⊆ C and C 6= {1}.
Let C be a winning coalition. If u1(a
′, T ′) < 0, since there is no change in continuation value, player 1
finds the deviation unprofitable. If u1(a
′, T ′) ≥ 0, then it must be the case that ∑j∈C\{1} uj(a′, T ′) ≤ 1,
so there must be a player j ∈ C\{1} such that uj(a′, T ′) ≤ 1, and we have
(1− δ)uj(a′, T ′) + δ(0) ≤ 1− δ ≤ 1
n− 1
so player j prefers following the convention over deviating and reverting to the core. As a result, no
coalition C has profitable one-shot deviation after any history, so σ1 is stable.
For i 6= 1, let σi be the convention that recommends (â, ∅,0) after every history. The convention is
stable, and gives each player i 6= 1 zero payoff.
Lemma 8. If |D| ≥ 2, when monitoring is perfect either with or without transfers, for every player
i ∈ N , there is a stable convention σi such that Ui(∅|σi) = 0 for every δ.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose {1, 2} ⊆ D. Let a1 ≡ (1, 0, . . . , 0) and a2 ≡ (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) be
two alternatives that allocate all payoff to player 1 and 2, respectively. It follows that both a1 and a2 are
in the core.
Case 1: Non-Transferable Utility. Let σ1 be the convention that recommends (a1, ∅) regardless of history;
for all i 6= 1, let σi be the convention that recommends (a2, ∅) regardless of history. Each σi is stable,
and Ui(∅|σi) = 0 for every i ∈ N .
Case 2: Perfectly Monitored Transfers. Let σ1 be the convention that recommends (a1, ∅,0) regardless
of history; for all i 6= 1, let σi be the convention that recommends (a2, ∅,0) regardless of history. Each
σi is stable, and Ui(∅|σi) = 0 for every i ∈ N .
Lemma 9. Suppose the set of payoff profiles from stable conventions is U . For each player i ∈ N , let
ui ≡ minu∈U ui be player i’s smallest possible payoff from stable conventions.
Non-Transferable Utility: let (a, ∅) be a stage-game outcome. Then (a, ∅) can be sustained as the outcome
of a stationary stable convention if and only if for every coalition C and alternative a′ ∈ EC(a), there is
a player i ∈ C such that
(1− δ)vi(a′) + δui ≤ vi(a) (27)
Perfectly Monitored Transfers: let (a, ∅, T ) be a stage-game outcome. Then (a, ∅, T ) can be sustained as
the outcome of a stationary stable convention if and only if for every coalition C, alternative a′ ∈ EC(a),
and transfers T ′C , there is a player i ∈ C such that
(1− δ)ui(a′, [T ′C , T−C ]) + δui ≤ ui(a, T )
Proof. We prove the result for the case of non-transferable utility. The proof for perfectly monitored
transfers uses a similar argument, the only difference being the augmentation of stage-game outcomes
with transfers.
To see the “only if” direction, suppose there exists a coalition C and alternative a′ such that inequal-
ities (27) fails for every i ∈ C. Towards a contradiction, suppose also that there exists a stationary stable
convention σ that sustains (a, ∅). Since σ is a stable convention, it follows that Ui(h|σ) ≥ ui for every
i ∈ C and all h ∈ H. As a result, for every i ∈ C,
(1− δ)vi(a′) + δUi(a′, C|σ) ≥ (1− δ)vi(a′) + δui > vi(a),
which implies that (a′, C) is a profitable deviation for coalition C, contradicting σ being a stable conven-
tion.
For the “if” direction, Inequality (27) implies that for every coalition C and alternative a′ ∈ EC(a),
there exits a player i∗|(a′,C) and a stable convention σi
∗|(a′,C) such that
(1− δ)vi∗|(a′,C)(a′) + δUi∗|(a′,C)(a′, C|σ
i∗|(a′,C)) ≤ vi∗|(a′,C)(a). (28)
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Consider a convention σ that recommends (a, ∅) on path, but switches to σi∗|(a′,C) if deviation (a′, C)
has occurred. Inequality (28) implies that on path, no coalition can find a deviation that makes every
member better-off. In addition, the fact that σi
∗|(a′,C) is a stable convention for each i∗|(a′,C) ensures that
after any off-path history, no coalition can find deviation that makes every member better-off. Therefore
σ is a stationary stable convention that sustains (a, ∅).
Lemma 10. Suppose there exist stable conventions {σi : i ∈ N} such that Ui(∅|σi) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Then for every fixed δ, the set of payoff profiles sustainable by stationary stable conventions is UPM (δ).
Proof. Since the game is non-dictatorial, no single player can form a winning coalition. It follows that
vi = 0 for all i ∈ N . For each player i, 0 is i’s smallest possible payoff from all stable conventions
(achieved, in particular, by the stable convention σi).
Case 1: Non-Transferable Utility. By Lemma 9, in order for a payoff profile u to be sustainable by a
stationary stable convention, it is necessary and sufficient that for every winning coalition C ∈ W, there
exist no alternative a′ ∈ EC(a) such that for every i ∈ C
(1− δ)a′i + δ · 0 = (1− δ)a′i > ui. (29)
Note that for every winning coalition C, this is true if and only if∑
i∈C
ui ≥
∑
i∈C
(1− δ)a′i = 1− δ
for all a′i ∈ EC(a). To see why, note that EC(a) consists of all points on the unit simplex such that∑
i∈C a
′
i = 1, so if
∑
i∈C ui < (1− δ) · 1, there must be a certain a′, representing a division of total payoff
1 among players in C, such that inequality (29) holds for every i ∈ C.
It follows that a payoff profile u is sustainable by a stationary stable convention if and only if∑
i∈C
ui ≥ 1− δ
for every C ∈ W.
Case 2: Perfectly Monitored Transfers. Let (a, ∅, T ) be an outcome that can be sustained by a stationary
stable convention, and u ≡ u(a, T ). By Lemma 9, this is true if and only if for every winning coalition
C ∈ W, there exist no alternative a′ ∈ EC(a) and transfers T ′C such that for every i ∈ C,
(1− δ)
[
a′i +
∑
j∈C
T ′ji −
∑
j∈C
T ′ij
]
+ (1− δ)
∑
j /∈C
Tji + δ · 0 > ui.
In the inequality above, it is without loss to focus on alternative a′ such that
∑
i∈C a
′
i = 1. Let s
C
i (T ) ≡
(1−δ)∑j /∈C Tji denote the total transfer player i receives from outside of coalition C. Note that sCi (T ) ≥
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0. Since
∑
i∈C
[
a′i +
∑
j∈C T
′
ji −
∑
j∈C T
′
ij
]
=
∑
i∈C a
′
i = 1, the above condition is satisfied if and only if
there are no numbers {u′i}i∈C such that
∑
i∈C u
′
i = 1, and for every i ∈ C,
(1− δ)u′i + sCi (T ) > ui.
Following a similar argument as that in Case 1, this is satisfied if and only if for every winning coalition
C, ∑
i∈C
ui ≥ 1− δ +
∑
i∈C
sCi (T ). (30)
Now, since sCi (T ) ≥ 0 for all C, i and T , it follows that u ∈ UPM (δ), so nothing outside of UPM (δ) can
be sustained.
To see everything in UPM (δ) can be sustained, fix any u ∈ UPM (δ) and let a ≡ u be the alternative
identified with u, we will show the outcome (a, ∅,0) can be sustained by a stationary stable convention.
Now, for every winning coalition C, since sCi (0) = 0 for all C and i, it follows that inequality (30) is
satisfied if and only if ∑
i∈C
ui ≥ 1− δ. (31)
Since u ∈ UPM (δ), inequality (31) indeed holds for every winning coalition, so u can be sustained by a
stationary stable convention.
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